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Abstract
In mainstream programming languages such as Java, a common way to enable concurrency is to manually introduce explicit concurrency
constructs such as multi-threading. In multi-threaded programs, managing synchronization between threads is a complicated and challenging
task for the programmers due to thread interleaving and heap interference that leads to problems such as deadlocks, data races. With these
considerations in mind, access permission-based dependencies have been investigated as an alternative approach to verify the correctness
of multi-threaded programs and to exploit the implicit concurrency present in sequential programs without using explicit concurrency
constraints. However, significant annotation overhead can arise from manually adding permission-based specifications in a source program,
diminishing the effectiveness of existing permission-based approaches.
In this paper, we present a framework, Sip4J, to automatically extract access permission-based implicit dependencies from sequential
Java programs, by performing inter-procedural static analysis of the source code. Moreover, we integrate and extend an existing permission-
based verification tool, Pulse, to automatically verify correctness of the inferred specifications and to reason about their concurrent behaviors.
Our evaluation on some widely-used benchmarks gives strong evidence of the correctness of the inferred annotations and their effectiveness
in enabling concurrency in sequential programs.
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1. Introduction
Enabling concurrency for imperative and object-oriented lan-
guages has become one of the grand challenges for the IT industry
today1. This is because of the nature of the imperative and object-
oriented programming paradigms where the compiler follows the
execution order in which the program is written, i.e., sequential. In
such languages, programmers manually introduce concurrency by
using explicit concurrency constructs, e.g., multi-threading-related
classes such as Thread, Runnable in Java. Unfortunately, traditional
multi-threading models frequently result in deadlocks or unwar-
ranted race conditions that are hard to debug. Fractional permissions,
a way to ensure the non-interference of program states in parallel
programs is hence introduced to alleviate these issues [13]. Frac-
tional permissions encode the read and write effects of a reference
on a referenced object using concrete values 1 and 0 where the
value 0 represents the absence of permission, whereas 1 represents
unique (exclusive read and write) permission on the referenced
object and any value greater than zero models the read-only access
for a shared object.
Symbolic permission [8, 6], simply called access permission, is
an extension of fractional permissions. It is a novel abstraction that
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combines the read, write and aliasing information of a referenced
object. Instead of using fractional values to represent the read and
write access among multiple references, symbolic permissions repre-
sent and track permission flow through the system using high-level
abstractions (permission types) such as immutable or unique, etc.
A group of CMU researchers led by Jonathan Aldrich man-
ually wrote permission-based typestate contracts on a number of
Java APIs to model and reason about the correctness of usage
protocols in typestate-based sequential and concurrent programs
[8, 9, 6, 5, 10] etc., and further parallelise the execution of these
programs in a permission-based typestate-oriented programming
paradigm Plaid [2]. Further, having the access permission sup-
port in the Plaid infrastructure, the group worked in a joint research
project and designed a by-default concurrent programming language
and a runtime system, Æminium [43], to parallelise execution of
sequential programs based on access permissions. Furthermore,
inference of fractional and quantified permissions has been inves-
tigated by Peter Müller and his colleagues [22, 20] to verify class-
based concurrent programs based on the abstract interpretations [18].
Similarly, permission-based specifications have been used in many
formal approaches to address issues related to safe concurrency, se-
curity and verification of functional and domain specific properties
[35, 31, 15, 47, 29, 41, 17, 30, 26, 37, 28].
Unfortunately, in order to benefit from access permissions, pro-
grammers have to manually add appropriate permission-based spec-
ifications (e.g., annotations) as dependency information in the pro-
gram. Not only do programmers need to spend time getting famil-
iarised with a completely new specification language and runtime
system, they also need to manually write specifications in the source50
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code which is laborious and error-prone. Moreover, given the intri-
cacies in creating these constructs, it is very likely for a programmer
to omit important dependencies or create wrong specifications that
may again lead to problems such as race-conditions and (or) dead-
locks. These issues have hindered the wider adoption of access
permission-based approaches.
To this end, in our work, we aim to resolve the aforementioned
issues by introducing to the community a novel approach that infers
implicit dependencies from the source program in the form of access
permissions The goal is to free programmers from the annotation
overhead for manually adding permission-based dependencies in
the program, thereby solving the common problem faced by the
existing access permission-based approaches.
We are interested in inferring permission-based dependencies
for Java programs. This paper presents a comprehensive framework
called Sip4J to infer access permission contracts from sequen-
tial Java programs using permission inference technique. To infer
permission-based dependencies from the source code, our technique
is based on Abstract Syntax Tree and follows a set of pre-defined
syntactic rules and graph abstractions. A tool based on the technique
is implemented as an Eclipse Plugin, integrated with an existing
permission-based model-checking tool Pulse [41]. We then empiri-
cally evaluate the proposed technique by verifying the correctness of
the inferred specifications and hence demonstrating the effectiveness
of the tool. We also measure the execution speed of our inference
technique on a number of widely-used benchmark programs and
realistic Java applications.
It is worth mentioning that the technique proposed in this work,
although focused on Java language only, should also be applicable
to other object-oriented programming languages. Indeed, we be-
lieve that the inferred specifications and our framework can be used
by existing permission-based verification approaches to verify the
correctness of a program without annotation overhead. It is also
able to discover some of the syntactical errors in a program such as
null pointer references at compile time. Ultimately, it can be used
to reason about the concurrent behaviour of a sequential program
without imposing extra work on the programmers.
To summarise, in this work, we make the following contribu-
tions:
• We design and implement a prototype tool called Sip4j for auto-
matically inferring permission-based specifications for sequential
Java programs. Additionally, the core functionalities of Sip4j are
further integrated into Eclipse as a plugin.
• We integrate and extend Pulse to automatically verify the validity
of permission specifications generated by Sip4j and to reason
about their concurrent behavior.
• We evaluate Sip4j on both benchmark and real-world sequential
Java programs. Our experimental results show that Sip4j is in-
deed capable of inferring access permissions for Java programs.
Furthermore, with additional experiments, we empirically show100
that the inferred permissions are not only useful for parallelising
Java programs but also helpful for pinpointing program errors
such as null pointer references and to perform reachability (code)
analysis of the program at method level.
To help readers replicate our results, we have provided the
Sip4J tool, the benchmark programs and their analysis reports by
the Sip4J framework on GitHub:
https://github.com/Sip4J/Sip4J
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides
an introduction to access permissions, permission contracts and a
motivating example. Section 3 describes the Sip4J framework
to generate and verify permission-based specifications. Section
3.1 discusses the Sip4J permission inference approach in detail
and Section 3.2 discusses Pulse as a permission checker and its
integration within the Sip4J framework. Section 4 demonstrates
the correctness and the effectiveness of the proposed technique on
benchmark applications. In Section 5 and 6, we elaborates on the
implications and limitations of the Sip4j framework and its anal-
ysis in general. Section 7 discusses the related work. Finally, we
conclude the paper in Section 8 and propose some future directions.
2. Motivation and Preliminaries
This section briefly explains and elaborates the challenges posed
by parallelising imperative programming models and how access
permission-based specifications can be used to handle those chal-
lenges.
2.1. Parallelising sequential imperative programs: A motivation
example
Multi-core architectures are ubiquitous and have become the
norm due to the parallel execution power made available by the
multi-core processors in them. Herb [45] famously stated “The
free lunch is over” which means current applications can no longer
benefit from the free ride (rapid performance improvements) unless
programmers redesign current applications or otherwise exploit the
potential concurrency present in the system. However, software
industry has not yet been able to fully exploit the performance boost
of multi-core systems, principally due to inherit limitations of main-
stream (imperative and object-oriented) programming languages
such as Java, C++, etc. Indeed, most of the existing applications are
still being written in sequential programming paradigms, without
using multi-threading, which cannot benefit from the characteristics
of multi-core machines.
In order to benefit from modern multi-core systems, there is a
need to transform traditional sequential programs to parallel pro-
grams, so as to improve the execution time of these programs and
to free programmers from the low level ordering and reasoning
overhead about thread synchronization.
Unfortunately, in imperative programming languages such as
Java, because of the implicit dependencies between the code and
shared states, methods dependant on the same mutable object do
not explicitly show their side effects (the read and write behaviors)150
to each other. It is hence non-trivial for programmers to manually
parallelise sequential programs without the fear of data races. Let
us take Listing 1 as an example.
1 class ArrayCollection {
2 public Integer [] array1;
3 ArrayCollection (){
4 array1 = new Integer [10];
5 for(int i = 0; i < array1.length; i++)
6 array1[i] = (int)(Math.random () * 10);
7 }
8 public void printColl(Integer [] coll) {
9 for(int i = 0; i < coll.length; i++){
10 System.out.println(" "+coll[i]);}
2
11 }
12 public void incrColl(Integer [] coll) {
13 for (int i = 0; i < this.array1.length; i++){
14 this.array1[i] = this.array1[i] + i; }
15 for (int j = 0; j < coll.length; j++){
16 coll[j] = coll[j] + j; }
17 }
18 public boolean isSorted(Integer [] coll) {
19 boolean flag = false;
20 int j = 0;
21 for(int i = 0;i<coll.length && j<coll.length;i++){
22 if(coll[i] > coll[j])
23 flag = true;
24 else
25 flag = false;
26 }
27 return flag;
28 }
29 public Integer findMax(Integer [] coll) {
30 int max;
31 max = coll [0];
32 for (int i = 1; i < coll.length; i++){
33 if(coll[i] > max)
34 max = coll[i];}
35 return max;
36 }
37 public void computeStat (Integer [] coll){
38 printColl(coll);
39 System.out.println("Is sorted = "+isSorted(coll));
40 System.out.println("Max number = "+findMax(coll));
41 }
42 public void tidyupColls (Integer [] coll){
43 this.array1 = null;
44 coll = null ;}
45 }
46 class ObjectClass {200
47 public Integer [] array2;
48 public Client x,y,z,w;
49 ObjectClass (){
50 array2 = new Integer [10];
51 for(int i = 0; i < array2.length; i++){
52 array2[i] = (int)(Math.random () * 10);
53 }
54 x = new Client (); y = new
Client (); z = new Client (); w = new Client ();
55 }
56 public void manipulateObjects (Client p1 , Client p2){
57 x = p1;
58 Client t = x;
59 y = t;
60 x.data = 10;
61 System.out.println("z.data = "+p2.data ;}
62 }
63 class Client{
64 Integer data = 100;
65 public static void main(String [] a) {
66 ArrayCollection obj1 = new ArrayCollection ();
67 ObjectClass obj2 = new ObjectClass ();
68 obj1.incrColl(obj2.array2);
69 obj1. computeStat (obj1.array1);
70 obj1. computeStat (obj2.array2);
71 obj1. tidyupColls (obj2.array2);
72 obj2. manipulateObjects (obj2.w, obj2.z);
73 }
74 }
Listing 1: A sample Java program.
Listing 1 illustrates a sequential Java program with three user-
defined classes ArrayCollection, ObjectClass and Client.
These three classes contain eight methods and access two shared
collection objects (i.e., array1 and array2). As an example, the
ObjectClass composes the Client class and manipulates its
member data using method manipulateObjects(). To bene-
fit from the modern multi-core facilities, certain methods of this
sample program can be parallelly executed so as to improve the
overall performance. Indeed, if a given two methods do not write
the same object at the same time, these two methods could be par-
allelised. For example, since methods computeState(array1),
computeState(array2) and manipulateObjects() do notma-
nipulate the same shared objects, they could be potentially paral-
lelised. Oppositely, methods incrColl(array2) and tidyUp-
Coll(array2) can not be parallelised as they may write the same
object at the execution time.
Unfortunately, manually identifying and tracking the object ac-
cesses and the order in which these accesses are made is a laborious
(in-terms of time and effort) and error-prone task for programmers.
It is very likely for a programmer to omit important dependencies or250
identify the wrong dependencies. The situation becomes worse in
case of unrestricted aliasing in the program, the hallmark feature of
imperative programming models [11]. Indeed, analysis of method
manipulateObjects() shows that it accesses four objects (x, y,
z, w) as its data members. Explicitly, it mutates only one object
i.e. x by writing on its data field but actually it mutates object
y and w as well due to aliasing of the objects withing the method.
These alias variables will create side effects for other methods ac-
cessing the same objects when executed in parallel. Moreover, as
the program size (complexity) increases, it becomes non-trivial for a
programmer to identify the implicit dependencies between different
program parts by just looking at the source code.
To exploit the potential concurrency present in a Java program,
every method should either avoid these side effects (change in some
value outside method scope) or should explicitly mention them. This
information can be used to compute the data dependencies at differ-
ent level of granularity within the code and parallelise execution of
the program to the extent permitted by these dependencies. There-
fore, we need a mechanism that can express the mutability and alias-
ing between shared objects that can mitigate the undesirable effects
to other methods in an expressive way, while allowing a safe exe-
cution order within methods. The objective is to free programmers
from the tedious and low-level analysis overhead for identifying and
tracking the implicit dependencies present at the code level.
The study of literature shows that access permissions, a novel
abstraction that combines (models) the effects (read and write) and
aliasing information of a referenced object, provides a flexible con-
trol mechanism to track all the references of a particular object and
update state changes to all such references [8]. Access permission is
hence suitable for characterizing the way (read and write) a shared
resource is accessed by multiple references and can express the
implicit dependencies present in the system while making them
explicit, thereby the side effects. Furthermore, permission-based
specifications pose their own ordering constraints and therefore can
be used to perform method’s operations in a non-interfering manner
and parallelise code without using the low-level concurrency and
ordering constraints [1, 43].
2.2. Access Permissions
Before elaborating the efficacy and expressiveness of permission-
based specifications to model aliasing and parallelising sequential
imperative programs, we provide an overview of access permissions
semantics, permission co-existence, access permission splitting (join-
ing) rules and permission-based contracts.
Access permissions are used to describe whether or not an object
is being aliased, whether a given reference can modify the refer-
enced object, and whether other references (aliases) that point to the
same object, if any, are allowed to modify the object [8].
Let x and y be the current and other reference respectively and
let o represent a referenced object. There are five (symbolic) permis-
sion types that can be assigned to a reference x for the referenced300
object o in the presence of the alias y.
3
unique(x) : This permission provides to reference x an exclusive
read and modify access on the referenced object o at any given
time. No other reference (e.g. y) to the same object can co-exist
while x has unique permission on o.
x yo
r
w
full(x) : This permission grants reference x with read and write
access to the referenced object o, and at the same time o may also
be read, but not written, by other reference y.
x yo
r
w
r
share(x) : This permission is the same as full(x), except that now
other references y can also write on the referenced object o.
x yo
r
w
r
w
pure(x) : This permission gives a reference x read-only access on
a referenced object o. Moreover, other reference ymay have read
and write access on the same object.
x yor
r
w
immutable(x) : This permission grants a non-modifying access on
the referenced object o to both the current reference x and any
other reference y.
x yor r
Table 1 below summarises how access permissions on a refer-
enced object o can co-exist between the current reference (x) and
the other reference (y) [14].
Table 1: Co-existing access permissions on the same object [13]
This reference (x) Access rights of (x) Other references (y)
unique read/write none
full read/write pure
share read/write share, pure
pure read full, pure, immutable
immutable read immutable, pure
The table shows that the unique access permission is very re-
strictive, as it consumes all the read and write permissions on a
particular object and does not share any access with any other refer-
ence on the same object. In contrast, pure is the least restrictive as
it only consumes read permission and at the same time shares read
permission and gives other references the exclusive write access on
the same object.
To infer five types of symbolic permissions from the source
code of a Java program, our permission inference approach models
the object’s accesses and their aliasing information at the method
level, in the form of permission-based graph models as shown above.
In the generated models, x corresponds to the current method and
y corresponds to other methods ("the rest of the world except the
current method") accessing the same object o. The details of the
Table 2: Access permissions splitting and joining rules [8].
Permission Splitting and joining Rules
1. unique(x;o;k)⇔ full(x1;o;k1)
⊗
pure(x2;o;k2)
2. unique(x;o;k)⇔ immutable(x1;o;k1)
⊗
immutable(x2;o;k2)
3. full(x;o;k)⇔ share(x1;o;k1)
⊗
pure(x2;o;k2)
4. share(x;o;k)⇔ full(x1;o;k1)
⊗
pure(x2;o;k2)
5. immutable(x;o;k)⇔ pure(x1;o;k1)
⊗
immutable(x2;o;k2)
6. unique(x;o;k)⇔ share(x1;o;k1)
⊗
share(x2;o;k2)
7. immutable(x;o;k)⇔ immutable(x1;o;k1)
⊗
immutable(x2;o;k2)
8. share(x;o;k)⇔ share(x1;o;k1)
⊗
pure(x2;o;k2)
9. share(x;o;k)⇔ share(x1;o;k1)
⊗
share(x2;o;k2)
10. full(x;o;k)⇔ full(x1;o;k1)
⊗
pure(x2;o;k2)
permission inference and the graph construction mechanism are
further explained in Section 3.
2.2.1. Access permission splitting and joining rules350
Access permissions are considered as resources in Linear logic
[24] that cannot be duplicated (discarded). Once amethod consumes
its permissions they are no longer available to other methods until
this method returns the same permissions again.
Access permission can be split into one or more relaxed permis-
sions i.e., fractions of original permission using fractional values in
the range (0,1)) and then merged back into more restrictive or origi-
nal permission. This phenomenon is known as fractional permission
analysis where fractions keep tracks of the way the permissions were
split and joined back. This information can be used to verify system
properties, based on specific criteria and parallelise execution of the
program by tracking the permission flow through the system.
Table 2 shows access permissions splitting and joining rules to
track permission flow through the program.
In Table 2, x represents current reference, o represents the
shared object and k represents the fraction of permission assigned
to a particular reference The operator multiplicative conjunction (A⊗
B) denotes simultaneous occurrence of permissions by multi-
ple references, say x1, x2, on the same referenced object o. The
symbol⇔ represents the two way operation of splitting and join-
ing permissions. For example, unique access permission (Rule 1.)
having k fractions can be divided into k1 fraction of full and k2
fraction of pure permission on the same object and then joined back
accordingly. Likewise, a unique access permission (Rule 6.) can
be split into two share permissions but cannot be split into a share
and immutable permission as the immutable permission cannot
co-exist with the share permission on the same object. Linearity of
resources forces the unique permission to be consumed, replaced
by two share permissions, which can be further split according to
splitting rules and then joined back.
2.2.2. Access Permission Contracts in Plural and Pulse
In our work, we are interested in inferring permission-based
specifications for Java programs. To the best of our knowledge, there
are only two research tools that are directly related to Java-based
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access permissions, namely Plural2[9] and Pulse3[41].
It is worth mentioning here that the permission inference ap-
proach, presented in this paper, integrates the Pulse tool to verify
the correctness of the inferred specifications. It further extends the
concurrency analysis in the Pulse tool to perform a comprehensive
concurrency analysis of the input sequential program, based on
five types of symbolic permissions. Therefore, it is non-trivial for
readers of the permission inference approach to first understand the
Plural specifications and Pulse analysis itself.
Pulse [41, 17] is a permission-based model-checking tool imple-
mented as Java Eclipse plug-in. It takes a Plural annotated program
i.e., a Java program annotated with access permission contracts and
typestate information, as input. The typestate information is added,
as a part of method specifications, for the Pulse input program.
However, inferring (verifying) the typestates information is not an
immediate objective of this research. Pulse translates the Plural400
specifications into a semantically equivalent abstract state-machine
model. The model captures the dynamic behavior of a program as a
sequence of method calls obeying the access permission semantics,
and the typestate information associated with the referenced objects.
Pulse employs the evmdd-smc symbolic model-checker [40] to
verify the machine model. The model checker ensures that the input
specifications satisfy a set of core integrity properties , specified as
Computation Tree Logic (CTL)[27] formulae, by performing the
reachability graph analysis of the generated state space.
The permission checking approach employs Pulse analysis to
verify the correctness of input specifications and to reason about
their concurrent behavior in following ways.
Access permission Correctness. Pulse enforces that access per-
missions do not violate their intended semantics, by generating he
discrete state semantics of the input specifications and by encoding
the generated semantics into a fully discrete machine model. It then
verifies the correctness of the input specifications, by following the
pre-defined CTL formulae through the model checking mechanism.
Method Satisfiability Analysis. Pulse identifies missing specifica-
tions by performing the method (un)satisfiability analysis of the
input specifications based on the pre-defined CTL formulae. The
method satisfiability (reachability) analysis of a method is based on
the requires clause (pre-permission) in a method contract. The
method satisfiability analysis checks whether the pre-condition
of a method is met. A method is satisfied (reachable) if all its pre-
conditions are met or if it obtains enough (pre-) permission to start
its execution. The presence of the unsatisfiable methods, due to the
method’s unsatisfiable pre-condition, indicates an error (misspelled
or missing specifications) in the input specifications, or it can be
due to program error such as the use of null references. The
presence of an unsatisfiable method also indicates that no possible
client can fulfill the method’s contract i.e., the requires clause
and this method is not called under any circumstances; thus the
method remains unreachable.
2Pluralism: Modular Object Protocol Checking for Java, https://code.
google.com/archive/p/pluralism/
3PULSE: A Model-Checking Tool to Verify Typestates and Access Permis-
sions Specifications of Java Programs, http://poporo.javerianacali.edu.
co/aeminium/pulsepulse/pulse.php.
Concurrency Analysis. Pulse identifies whether two methods can
be executed in parallel by identifying the immutable methods, i.e.,
methods that require read-only access on a shared object or the
methods that should always run in isolation, by following the (pre-)
permission contracts between two methods. It computes the number
of methods that can be executed with at least one other method, at
the class level, including the method concurrency analysis with itself.
Our permission inference framework borrows the Plural’s syn-
tax to generate the Pulse input program. Lets us briefly discuss the
syntax and semantics of access permissions in the Plural specifica-
tion language. A complete discussion of the Pulse correctness and
its extended concurrency analysis, for the example program given
in Listing 1, is explained in Section 3.2.
Plural (Permissions Let Us Reason about Aliases) [8, 9] is a for-
mal specification language and a tool, originally developed to ensure
protocol compliance in typestate-based sequential programs such450
as Java APIs. The program verification in Plural is based on access
permissions and typestate information where access permissions
encodes the read, write and aliasing behaviour of a method on the
referenced objects and typestates describe the set of valid object’s
states a method can be called on [44]. Plural supports five types of
symbolic permissions such as unique, immutable, full, pure and
share as a part of method specifications. Plural follows the Design
by Contract principle [36] to specify access permission contracts, as
pre- and post-conditions, at the method level.
In a Plural program, the annotation @Perm is used to specify
a permission contract where pre- and post-conditions are defined
using requires and ensures clause respectively. A typestate
in Plural is declared using @State clause. Typestate ‘alive’ is
a default global (root) state an object can be in. The precondition
(requires clause) in a method contract specifies the type of access
permissions (AP), a method requires on a referenced object (this)
and the typestate (ts), a referenced object should be in before the
method starts its execution.
The permission (ap) on a parameter is represented using nota-
tion AP(#i) where i is an integer that maps the position of a pa-
rameter in amethod declaration as 0→N−1where N is the number
of parameters in a method signature. The post-condition (ensures
clause) in a method contract specifies the permissions (AP′) that the
method generates on the referenced object (the parameter) to return it
back to the caller method and the typestate (s′) an object should hold
when the method completes its execution. The symbol ∗ shows the
multiplicity (one or more) of the referenced objects with permission
annotations. The notation ENDOFCLASS in is used to distinguish
multiple classes, in a source program, to perform the correctness
analysis of the access permission contracts at class level by Pulse.
2.3. Access permission contracts: motivation example revisited
We now revisit the motivating example we presented at the
beginning of this section to demonstrate the efficacy and expres-
siveness of permission-based specifications in enabling implicit
concurrency present in a sequential program.
Listing 2 shows an annotated version of the sample Java pro-
gram given in Listing 1, with permission contracts at the field level
in Plural style using a single typestate ’alive’. As discussed pre-
viously in Section 2.2.2, the approach adds the typestate (alive)
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information to perform the evaluation of the inferred specifications
by the Pulse tool, otherwise, inferring and verifying typestate is not
an objective of this research.
For simplicity, for parameters, we refer the objects accessed
against parameters using their identifier to show the aliasing informa-
tion explicitly, instead of using the parameter notations as in Plural.
1 class ArrayCollection {
2 public Integer [] array1 = new Integer [10];
3 @Perm(ensures="unique(array1) in alive")
4 public ArrayCollection () {}500
6 @Perm(requires="pure(array1) in alive",
7 ensures="pure(array1) in alive")
8 public void printColl(Integer [] coll) {}
10 @Perm(requires="share(array1)
in alive * share(array2) in alive",
11 ensures="share(array1)
in alive * share(array2) in alive")
12 public void incrColl(Integer [] coll) {}
14 @Perm(requires="pure(array1) in alive",
15 ensures="pure(array1) in alive")
16 public boolean isSorted(Integer [] coll) {}
18 @Perm(requires="pure(array1) in alive",
19 ensures="pure(array1) in alive")
20 public Integer findMax(Integer [] coll) {}
22 @Perm(requires="pure(array1) in alive",
23 ensures="pure(array1) in alive")
24 public void computeStat (Integer [] coll){}
26 @Perm(requires="unique(array1)
in alive * unique(array2) in alive",
27 ensures="none(array1)
in alive * none(array2) in alive")
28 public void tidyupColl (Integer [] coll){}
29 }
30 ENDOFCLASS
31 class ObjectClass {
32 public Integer [] array2 = new Integer [10];
33 public Client x = new Client (), y = new Client ();
34 public Client z = new Client (),w = new Client ();
35 @Perm(requires="full(x)
* full(y) * full(w) * immutable(z) in alive",
36 ensures="full(x)
* full(y) * full(w) * immutable (z) in alive")
37 void manipulateObjects (Client p1 , Client p2){}
38 }
39 ENDOFCLASS
40 class Client{
41 Integer data = 100;
42 @Perm(requires="none(obj1) * none(obj2) in alive",
43 ensures="unique(obj1) * unique(obj2) in alive ")
44 public static void main(String [] a) {
45 ArrayCollection obj1 = new ArrayCollection ();
46 ObjectClass obj2 = new ObjectClass ();
47 obj1.incrColl(obj2.array2);
48 obj1. computeStat (obj1.array1);550
49 obj1. computeStat (obj2.array2);
50 obj1. tidyupColls (obj2.array2);
51 obj2. manipulateObjects (obj2.w,obj2.z);
52 }
53 }
54 ENDOFCLASS
Listing 2: Access permission contracts for the example program given in Listing
1
Consider the permission contract for method printColl() in
Listing 2 at Line 6 & 7, “@Perm(requires="pure(array1) in
alive", ensures="pure(array1)" in alive)”. This con-
tract, for method printColl(), is generated following the method
call expression obj1.computeStat(obj1.array1) in Listing 1
at Line 69. It states that the method needs pure permission, as pre-
permission, on the object referenced by variable array1. The post-
permission specifies that the method guarantees to return the con-
sumed permissions, on the same object, to the caller of the method.
Having such specifications (permission-based dependencies) in
an explicit way, one can not only compute the number of immutable
(independent) methods i.e., the methods that do not change (access)
Unique(array2)
Split 2
computeStat(array2)
Pure(array2)
Pure(array2)
Unique(array1)
incrColl(array2)
Share(array2)
Split 5
printCollisSorted findMax
Pure(array2) Pure(array2)
Split 1
Pure(array1)
Share(array2)
Join 1
Pure(array2)
Pure(array2)Pure(array2)
Join 3
Unique(array1) Unique(array2)
tidyupColl
None(array1)
Unique(array2)Unique(array1)
None(array2)
Join 2
Pure(array1)
Pure(array1)
Pure(array1)
Share(array1)
Share(array1)
computeStat(array1)
Split 4
printCollisSorted findMax
Pure(array1)
Pure(array1)
ArrayCollection()
Pure(array1)Pure(array1) Pure(array2)
manipulateObjects()
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Unique(x, y, w)
Split 3
Full(x, y, w) Immutable (z)
Full(x, y, w) Immutable (z)
Unique(z)
Immutable (z)
Pure (x,y,w)
Figure 1: Permission-based method (call) concurrency graph of the Java program in
Listing 2.
a shared object, or the methods that should always run sequentially
but can also define the way (order), these methods can be executed
in parallel by considering methods side-effects.
Figure 1 shows the method call concurrency graph of the anno-
tated program following the access permission semantics (Section
2.2) and the access permission splitting and joining rules in Table 2.
The analysis reveals that, in total, 11 out of 13 method calls across
three classes can be executed in parallel.
The analysis shows that constructor methods cannot be paral-
lelized with any method as no other method can use an object before
it is being created with a Unique permission. However, constructors
instantiating different objects can be executed at the same time. Fur-
ther, it shows that methods that requires either read-only permissions
(pure or immutable) such as printColl() and findMax() on
the same (different) object can be executed in parallel.
However, methods that require full (write) permission on a
shared object e.g. incrColl() cannot be executed in parallel with
other methods writing on the same object, due to the side effects
they produce. However, these method can be parallelized with a)
other methods that either require read (pure) or write (full) permis-
sion on different objects such as method manipulateObjects()
and computeState() accessing different objects. Similarly, methods
that requires unique permission on the referenced objects such as
tidyupColls() should always run in isolation.
However, manually adding permission-based specifications in a
program pose significant annotation overhead for programmers and
that is itself a tedious and error prone task to do by hand. Hence,
the automatic inference of permission-based dependencies from the
source code is desirable.
3. Sip4j: The Permission Inference Framework
We propose a framework called Sip4J to automatically infer600
access permissions from a given sequential Java program and sub-
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sequently verify the correctness of inferred permissions. Figure 2
presents the working process of Sip4J, which is mainly made
up of two modules: (1) Permission Extractor and (2) Permission
Verifier. We now detail these two modules in Subsection 3.1 and
Subsection 3.2, respectively.
Permission 
Extractor
Permission 
Checker
integrate
 analysis report
    (output)
Figure 2: A high-level work-flow depiction of the Sip4J framework
3.1. The Permission Extractor
The permission extractor performs inter-procedural static anal-
ysis of an un-annotated Java program based on its Abstract Syntax
Tree (AST), the syntactic rules (Section 3.1.2) and the permission
inference rules (Section 3.1.3). The technique automatically reveals
the implicit dependencies present between the code (methods) and
the global states (class fields) in a Java program and maps them in
the form of access permission rights using graph abstractions.
The proposed technique includes the steps or phases as shown
in Figure 3:
.java
Un-Annotated
Java program
(Input)
3. Graph Traversal 
2. Graph Construction 
Syntactical Rules
Permission Inference 
Rules
1. Meta Data Extraction
Context Information
Data Flow Information
Alias Flow Information
Other Requried Information
Data Storage
.java
Plural annotated Java 
program 
(Output)
Pre 
Permission
Post 
Permission
Graph Traversal 
Graph 
Construction 
Syntactical Rules
Permission Inference 
Rules
Meta Data 
Extraction
Figure 3: The permission extractor phases.
Metadata Extraction. It parses the AST of the Java source code
to extract and maintain the metadata (dependency) information as
data flow, alias flow and context information, for all the shared
objects (class fields) accessed in a method (Section 3.1.1).
Graph Construction. For each method, based on the extracted
information, it constructs a permission-based graph model, using
graph notations and by following the pre-defined syntactic rules
(Section 3.1.2) that specifies the way to model object’s accesses
in a graph structure.
Graph Traversal. It traverses the constructed graph for eachmethod
and generates symbolic permissions for the objects referenced in a
method using access permission inference rules (cf. Section 3.1.3).
The approach automatically generates five types of access per-
missions e.g., unique, full, share, pure and immutable,
as pre- and post-permissions on individual field of an ob-
ject (class) at the method level. It further generates an annotated
version of the input program with permission contracts following
the Plural specifications (2.2.2) where permission are defined on
the receiver object (this). The pre-permissions are the permissions
that caller (client) of a method must provide on the referenced ob-
ject(s) before invoking amethod or alternatively, the permissions that
method requires on the referenced objects (fields, parameters etc.)
before being executed. The post-permissions are generated on
the referenced object(s) when the method completes its execution.
It is worth mentioning here that, following the Design by Con-
tract principle, a method is responsible to return either the consumed
(same) permission back to the caller of method e.g., unique for
unique or generate some restrictive permission such as full for
immutable, as post-permission to avoid the data integrity problems
when permissions are actually used for verification or paralleliza-
tion purpose. However, in certain cases, the pre- (post) permission
on a referenced object could be some special case e.g., the none
permission.
For example, in a Java program, it can happen in three situations650
a) if a method (re-)instantiates a (global) referenced object in its
local environment, b) if a method itself is the main() method from
where execution of the program starts, c) if a method creates a null
reference or un-instantiates a (global) referenced object. For the first
two cases, the approach generates none as pre-permission showing
the absence of permission which means that the method does not
require any permission on the referenced object, to start its execution.
In the last case, the approach generates none as post-permission on
the reference object
Another special case is when a method reads an object’s or class
field that is not being accessed by other methods in any way, in this
case, the pre- and post-permission for the referenced object would be
none. Moreover, no permission contract would be generated for a
method if it does not access any object’s (class) field from its global
environment or if it manipulates only the local references declared
in it. In the following sections, we will elaborate on each of the three
stages of the above mentioned permission inference technique using
method maniuplateObjects() shown in Listing 1 at line 56.
3.1.1. Metadata Extraction
To generate access permissions for the shared objects (global
states) at the method level, following the ccess permission seman-
tics (Section 2.2), we need to identify the way (read or write)
a referenced object4 is accessed by the current method and, at the
same time by its context ("the rest of the world" except the current
method). Moreover, we need to identify and track aliases of the
referenced objects (if any), to extract correct dependencies and to
maintain the integrity of the data during analysis. For this purpose,
the inference approach performs inter-procedural static analysis of
an un-annotated Java program based on its Abstract Syntax Tree
(AST). It performs data-flow, alias-flow and context analysis of
the source code to extract and maintain the read, write, aliasing
information for all the object’s (class) fields accessed in the current
method and their context (access by other methods) information.
The data flow and alias flow analysis of the source code is
based on the type of expression encountered in an expression state-
ment such as <FieldAccess>, <Assignment> etc., and the type
of referenced variable (object) accessed in each expression, such a
class field or a method’s local variable (parameter) that is alias of
some global reference (class field). We ignore all the local variables
and parameters that are not alias of any global reference, this is
4The term reference variable and reference object has been interchangeably used
throughout the paper, to represent a referenced object
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because manipulating local objects in a method does not affect the
access rights of the current and other methods. Further, the context
analysis (access by other methods) of a referenced object is based
on its data flow and alias flow analysis across other methods.
For each method in a Java program, the technique extracts the
read, write and aliasing information for a referenced object in a
method by parsing method’s signature and its body in following
ways:
Method Signature: The extractor parses a method’s signature
with its name, return type, visibility modifier,and formal parameters.700
The formal parameters are mapped with their corresponding argu-
ment (aliased) objects by fetching the method invocations of the
corresponding method in the program. This information is then used
to extract (maintain) the read, write and aliasing information of the
actual objects against parameters and to avoid the data inconsistency
problems while the same object is being accessed by other methods.
For example, in Listing 1 for method manipulateObjects() in
Line 56, the technique maps the formal parameters p1 and p2
with their actual objects i.e. w and z respectively and then track
them in the method body to identify their metadata information.
Method Body: In parsing a method, the technique parses each
expression statement in the AST of a method body. Each expression
is iteratively parsed to distinguish (fetch) the <read-only> and
<read-write> expressions and these information are recorded
accordingly. Like parameters, the technique maps all the local
references with their global reference (alias) if any, to extract and
maintain the data flow and alias flow information of the actual
referenced object during parsing. The handling of read and write
expressions in a statement is as follows:
• The <read-only> expressions are characterized by expression
nodes such as <FieldAccess>, <QualifiedName>, <Simple-
Name>, <MethodInvocation> etc., in the AST and parsed to
extract all the referenced objects accessed in the expression. This
information is maintained in the system as a part of data flow
(read access) analysis in the current method. For example, in
Listing 1 at line 61, the technique parses p2.data expression.
The information is maintained as a read access for the referenced
object z in the current method manipulateObjects().
• The <read-write> expressions are characterized by <Assign-
ment> expressions in the AST. The proposed technique performs
flow-sensitive analysis of the source code, where the type of a
reference on the left-hand side of an assignment statement is
determined based on its right-hand side expression.
During parsing, the assignment expressions are further catego-
rized as <value-flow>, <object-creation>, <address-flow>,
<null-address-flow>, <self-address-flow>, etc.,) expres-
sions based on the type of the right-hand side expression and
the data type of its referenced variables. For example, if the
data type of the right-hand side expression is a <Primtive>
type or if it is a <NumberLiteral> expression, the approach
treats the assignment expression as a <value-flow> expres-
sion. The <object-creation> expressions are characterized
by the presence of <ClassInstanceCreation>, <ArrayCre-
ation>, <ArrayInitializer> expressions on the right-hand
side of an assignment expression. Similarly, If the right-hand
side of an assignment statement yields a <ReferenceType> or
a <NullLiteral>, the expression is categorized as a <null-
address-flow> and a <address-flow> expression respec-
tively. The extractor recursively parses the right and the left
side of an assignment statement to identify the read-only and750
read-write expressions following the expression types and ex-
tracts (maintains) the read, write and aliasing information of all
the object’s (class) fields accessed in each expression.
Let us take Listing 1 again as an example.
The expression y = t; in Line 59, is categorized as an <address-
flow> expression. The technique maps the local reference t
with its actual (global) reference object i.e., x, as its alias. This
information is maintained as a part of alias flow analysis for
reference x.
Similarly, the expression x.data = 10; in Line 60, is treated
as a <value-flow> expression as the right hand side of the
expression is a <NumberLiteral> expression. The information
is updated as write access for the reference variable x in the
current method. Further, the analysis ensures that this change
(write operation) should be propagated to all the aliases of x i.e.,
reference y and w in this case, to ensure the integrity of data.
• The method calls in are handled using <MethodInvocation>
and <SuperMethodInvocation> etc., expressions in the AST.
As a part of the modular analysis, the permission inference tech-
nique is recursively applied to every callee methods (a non-
recursive method call) in the caller method. For this purpose,
the current state of the caller method is saved and restored when
all of its sub-methods have been parsed. The analysis of the
caller method does not been completed until the metadata of all
of its sub-methods have been extracted. For example, in Listing 1
in Line 38, the approach first parses method call expressions
printColl(), isSorted() and findMax() in the given or-
der, to extract the read, write and alias information on the object
referenced by the parameter coll. The extracted information
constitutes the metadata information for the caller method i.e.,
computeState(). The approach then uses this information to
generate the necessary permissions for the caller methods.
• It is worth mention that our technique does not parse the re-
cursive method calls (where a method call itself in its body)
expressions. This is because a recursive method call does not
change the way the caller method (itself) accesses the referenced
objects, reducing the analysis time as well. In case of infinite and
chained recursion (eg. when a method say foo1() calls method
foo2() that in-turn calls foo1() in its body), the analysis ter-
minates successfully. This is because, a) the underlying approach
maintains metadata (at least signatures), of each method’s say
foo1() before a indirect recursive call say foo2(), encounters
in its body which helps to identify and skip the second level
recursive call for the same method foo1() in the caller method
foo2() and the system continues parsing from the next expres-
sion in method foo2() b) For super method calls, in the case
of inheritance, are handled the same way (parsing its method
signature and body) as other non-recursive method calls.
• Further, the structure (conditional and dynamic structure) of
source program does not affect the permission inference mecha-800
nism as extractor parses all expressions encountered in an expres-
sion statement based on the type of expression and the type of ob-
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ject referenced in it irrespective of their access location. The anal-
ysis generates safe (write instead of read) permissions when an
object is accessed inmultiple expressions or when the same object
is accessed inside dynamic expressions such as switch cases,
if-else and loops etc., by updating the object’s meta data
across all the expressions in a method.
• Moreover, handling of the array data structures is the same for
single- and multi-dimensional arrays. This is because, at the
moment, the approach does not generate permissions on the indi-
vidual elements or dimensions in an array data-structure. It parses
the whole array object like an ordinary instance (class) variable.
The context analysis of all the objects accessed in the current
method is based on their read and write access by other meth-
ods in the program. There can be three possible contexts namely
Context-N (no access), Context-R (read-only) or Context-RW
(read and write) for a object accessed in the current method. The
Context-N is the most restrictive context as in this context, the cur-
rent method demands exclusive rights (both read and write) on the
object; thus reducing the chances to achieve maximum parallelism
across methods. The read context (Context-R) is less restrictive
than Context-N as it allows some kind of read access to other
references thus providing the possibility to achieve more parallelism.
Context-RW is the most flexible context as other references would
have both read and write access to the referenced object but the
possibility of parallelism is limited due to the expected (undesirable)
effects, such as data races.
The approach automatically identifies the context information
(read, write and none) for all the shared objects, following
their data-flow and alias-flow information in the program. It en-
sures to extract the safe context (access by other methods), for
the shared objects, by updating their accesses across other methods.
For example, in Listing 1, for method call printColl(coll) in
Line 38, the approach generates Context-RW for reference object
array1, as a part of its context analysis. This is because the array
object is being written by other methods such as incrColl() and
tidyupColl() in the program.
The exceptions to this rule are the objects accessed in <object-
creation> and <null-address-flow> expressions where cur-
rent method (un)instantiates an object in its body. In this case, the ap-
proach generates Context-N (no-access by other methods) for the
reference variable accessed on the left-hand side of an assignment ex-
pression, by following the expression type of the right-hand side ex-
pression. For example, in Listing 1, for expression (this.array1
= null;) in Line 43, the approach generates Context-N as its
context information for array1. This is because the currentmethod
un-instantiates the referenced object and it should have exclusive
access to create a null-reference (a reference variable that does not
refer to any object) and update this information to all of its alias(es).850
Similarly, for <object-creation> expression such as array1 =
new Integer [10]; in Listing 1 at Line 4, the approach gener-
ates Context-N for array object array1, as the current (construc-
tor) method ArrayCollection() instantiates a new object and,
at this moment, no other method can access it. This information is
then used to construct a permission-based graphmodel of the current
method and generate pre- and post-permissions for the referenced
objects accessed in it. The type of access permissions generated in
each context depends on the way (read or write) the current method
accesses the shared object.
It is worth mentioning here that in a Java program execution
starts from the main() method, therefore execution of the main()
method is independent of any context which means it does not re-
quire any (pre-) permission to access the objects from its global en-
vironment. The approach ensures to generate Context-N (none)
for all the referenced variables accessed in the main() method.
Following, the permission semantics in Section 2.2, application of
Context-N in-turn generates unique permissions on the referenced
object.
3.1.2. Graph Construction
The graph construction phase constructs a permission-based
graph model for each method. It maps the extracted data flow, alias
flow and context information, for all the (global) referenced objects
accessed in a method, using graph abstractions. Figure 4 shows the
permission-base graph model of method manipulateObjects()
generated by the Sip4J framework.
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Figure 4: The access permission graph model of method maniuplateObjects()
I. Graph Notations
To construct a permission-based graph model, we use some
special nodes, edges and conventions which are described below:
Graph Nodes: The access permission graph is made up of three
types of nodes:
• A variable node, depicted as a labelled circle, models a ref-
erence object o accessed by the current and (or) its context.
For example, x in Figure 4 represents an object accessed in
method manipulateObjects() in Listing 1.
• this_m is an abstraction, a labelled rectangle, that represents
the current method accessing the referenced object . For exam-
ple, method manipulateObjects() in Listing 1 is labelled
as this_m in Figure 4.
• context is an abstraction, depicted as a labelled rectangle, that
represents the collective access of other methods accessing the
same object or the current method’s global environment.
The nodes this_m and context have been introduced to
make graph construction and traversal process simpler.
Graph Edges: There are two types of edges that model the way
(read, write, and alias), a referenced object o is accessed in the
current method (this_m) and by its context (global environment).
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• read/write edges are depicted as directed and solid edges la-
belled as ‘r’ or ‘w’. For example, in Figure 4, there exists a read
and a write edge between the current method (this_m) and vari-900
able node x. Similarly, objects x, y, w, z are read by the
client method (main()) in Listing 2 so a read edge with label
‘r’ is drawn from the context node to all of these variable
nodes.
• alias edge is used to model an alias of a reference, if any. The
alias edge is depicted as a directed and dotted edge labelled with
letter ‘a’ between two references. For example, x is an alias
of w in Figure 4.
II. Modelling Object’s Access in a Graph Structure
We formally specify syntactic rules to support the metadata anal-
ysis and to model the object’s accesses in a permission-based graph
model. The rules are based on the type of expression encounter in an
expression statement and the type of reference variables accessed in
each expression. For example, in the syntactical rules, the notation
<grv> represents a (global) referenced object i.e., a class field or
a parameter that is alias of a class field, the notation <lrv> repre-
sents a method’s local variable that is an alias of a global reference
and <lv> is a method’s local variable other than <lrv>. The rules
are categorized into two types depending on their usage: a) Context
rules, b) Statement rules. The statement rules, for simplicity, are
further categorized as method call and non-method call rules.
The rules are designed to follows the style of sequent calculus, as
shown in equation 1, with logic connectives and implication( op-
erator, that considers rules as formulas (resources) and enforces their
constructive interpretation to extract and map the object’s accesses
in a precise way.
<Exp-Statement>
<Rule-Description>
(<Rule-Name>, <grv>) (1)
The rule’s name (<Rule-Name>, <grv>), itself follows the type
of referenced object (GR for <grv>, LR for <lrv> and L for
<lv>) and the type of expression (read, write and address flow)
encountered.
Although the rules are self explanatory, we describe some of
them, to provide an intuition on mathematical specifying them and
to validate the permission inference mechanism through them.
• The Context rules specify the way to add read and write edges
between context and variable nodes. The context of refer-
enced object is specified as Context-N (no access), Context-R
(read access) or Context-RW (read and write access). For exam-
ple, the (Context-R, <grv>) rule specifies that we need to
add a read edge from context to variable node to show that
the object (<grv>) accessed in the current method is also read by
other methods.
<grv>
(Context-R, <grv>)
addReadEdge(context,<grv>)
• The Statement rules describe different ways (read and write) to
add edges between a variable node and the current method as
well as its context (if any).
For example, the (GR-Val-Flow,<grv>) rule given below, mod-
els the write access of the current method (this_m) on left hand
side object (<grv>) in an assignment statement. This rule states
that we should add a write edge from current method this_m to
the <grv> node. It further ensures that this change should be
propagated to all the aliases of <grv> to maintain integrity of
data during parsing. Therefore, in the graph, we need to add a
write edge from this_m node to all its alias(es) nodes, if any.
[Prim_Type] <grv> = <grv1> |<LITERAL>
addWriteEdge(this_m,<grv>),apply(GR-Read-Only,<grv1>),
(∀a∈ aliasOf(<grv>)((addWriteEdge(this_m,a))))
All the references on right hand side of the assignment expressions
are modeled following the appropriate <read-only> rules given in
Appendix A.1.
Similarly, the (LR-Addr-Flow, <grv>) rule models an <address-
flow> statement of the form <lrv> = <grv>. The rule states that
we should add an alias (pointee edge) edge from local reference
(<lrv>) to the global field (<grv>) and should remove its existing
alias edge, if any. The analysis keeps track of the changes in the
state of <lrv>, as a part of alias-flow analysis, that could affect the
object referenced by the global reference (<grv>) and its aliases.
[<Ref_Type>] <lrv> = <grv>
(∃aliasEdge(<lrv>,<grv1>)(removeAliasEdge(<lrv>,<grv1>)),
addAliasEdge(<lrv>,<grv>),apply(GR-Read-Only,<grv>)
• The MCall rules capture method invocation expressions. The950
method call rules specify the way to add read and write edges in
the caller method graph as a result of a (sub) method call. The type
of edges added in the caller method graph depends on the post
access permissions (<post-perm>) generated by a called method
on its referenced object(s) (<grv>). This is because, when actually
parallelizing code based on permissions, the caller method needs
to provide the pre-permissions for all the object’s (class) fields
accessed in the called method, to execute the called method as a
part of its own execution.
For example, for a method call MCall(<Full>, <grv>) that
generates full permission on its reference object (<grv>), as post
permissions, we need to add both a read and write edge from
the called method (this_m) to the variable (<grv>) node and
apply the read context rule on <grv>, by following the semantics
of full permission.
MCall([<args>])|super.MCall([<args>])|super([<args>])
MCall(Full, <grv>)
addreadWriteEdge(this_m,<grv>),apply(Context-R,<grv>)
Other expressions are handled similarly by following the appropriate
syntactic rules. A complete list of syntactic rules for modelling
object’s accesses in a graph model is given in Appendix A.1.
3.1.3. Graph Traversal& Permission Generation
The graph traversal phase generates five kinds of symbolic per-
missions on the referenced objects at the method level by traversing
the permission-based graphmodel of eachmethod and following the
access permission inference rules. The type of access permissions
generated depends on the type of edges between the current method
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(this_m) and the variable nodes and the presence (or absence)
of alias edges between variable nodes. For example, the (Full,
<grv>) permission inference rule states that:
• There must not be a write edge from context to <grv> node;
and
• Theremust exist a read and awrite edge from this_m to <grv>
node.
∃readWriteEdge(this_m,<grv>) ∧ ∃readEdge(context,<grv>)
∧ ¬∃writeEdge(context,<grv>)
(Full)
Full(<grv>)
Listing 2 shows the annotated version of the input Java program
given in Listing 1, generated by the Sip4J framework, with access
permission contracts at the field level. In Listing 2, Line 35 & 36
shows the permission contract (as pre- and post-permissions) for
the method manipulateObjects(), by traversing its permission
graph model given in Figure 4 and by following the Full and Im-
mutable permission inference rules. It is worth noting here that
all the parameters and local references, in Figure 4, are mapped
with their global references to generate permissions on the actual
referenced objects.
Other kinds of access permissions are generated using their cor-
responding rules. A complete list of access permission inference
rules is attached in Appendix A.2.
3.2. The Permission Checker
As the second module of Sip4j, the permission checker aims at
verifying the correctness and effectiveness of the inferred specifica-
tions. As discussed previously in Section 2.2.2, for this purpose, it
extends and integrates Pulse, a permission-based verification tool
that verifies correctness of the Plural specifications, i.e., a Java1000
program annotated with access permission contracts and typestate
information, in isolation to program code. The permission checker
extends the Pulse tool in following three ways.
(1) Pre-Processing: As a part of pre-processing, Sip4J automat-
ically generates the Pulse translated version of the input program
with Plural specifications where permissions are defined at the
object (using keyword “this”) level and that follows the Design
by Contract principle to generate pre- and post-permissions as a
part of method contract. It is worth mentioning here that Pulse
does not support overloaded methods, as a part of its analysis,
even if the method is provided with different method signature and
permission contracts.
The permission checker makes following changes in the anno-
tated Java program given in Listing 2 to generate an input (Plural
annotated) program acceptable by the Pulse tool.
• It generates a non-parameterized (default) constructor, even if
no explicit constructor is defined in the class, to generate unique
permission on the receiver object (this) (see Listing 3 line
4), that is later used to perform permission analysis of other
methods accessing the same object.
• For non-constructor methods, it generates conservative and safe
permission for the receiver object (this) using the permissions
generated at the field level. For this purpose, it computes max-
imum of the pre- and post- permissions of all the individual
fields associated with the current instance of object (see Listing
3 line 15 & 16).
• For non-constructor methods, it generates notation <AP>(#i)
to represent pre- and post-permissions for the referenced param-
eters (see Listing 3 line 15 & 16).
• For non-constructor methods, it generates permission contracts
following the relation P !=Qwhere pre (P) and post (Q) condi-
tions should be same (see Listing 3 line 7 & 8).
• It automatically add other required annotations as a part of
annotated program such as:
– An import statements to support Plural annotations (Listing
3, line 1) as a part of program.
– It automatically add typestate ‘alive’ using @States state-
ment at the class level (Listing 3, line 2).
– Typestate as a part of pre- and post- permission (Listing 3,
line 3).
– The annotation ENDOFCLASS at the end of each class (List-
ing 3, line 10 & 19).
Listing 3 shows the Plural annotated version of methods tidyup-
Coll(), manipulateObjects() and the default constructors
in ArrayCollection and ObjectClass class.
The annotations generated for the Pulse translated version of the
input program also shows the minimum annotation overhead im-
posed by the existing permission-based verification approaches
such as Plural and Pulse to verify program behavior.
1 import edu.cmu.cs.plural.annot .*;
2 @States({@State(name = "alive")})
3 class ArrayCollection {
4 @Perm(ensures="unique(this) in alive")
5 ArrayCollection () { }
6 @Perm(requires="unique(this) in alive * unique (#0)
in alive",
7 ensures="unique(this) in alive * unique (#0) in
alive")
8 public void tidyupColls (Integer [] coll) { }
9 }
10 ENDOFCLASS
11 @States({@State(name = "alive")})
12 class ObjectClass {
13 @Perm(ensures="unique(this) in alive")
14 ObjectClass () { }
15 @Perm(requires="full(this) in alive * full (#0) in
alive * pure (#1) in alive",
16 ensures="full(this) in alive * full (#0) in alive
* pure (#1) in alive")
17 void manipulateObjects (Client p1 , Client p2) { }
18 }
19 ENDOFCLASS
Listing 3: The Plural annotated version of some of the methods given in Listing
2.
(2) Extended Concurrency Analysis: The permission checking1050
approach extends the Pulse analysis to perform a comprehensive
concurrency analysis of sequential Java programs based on inferred
permissions.
In Pulse, two methods are considered parallel if both require
pure(read access) as pre-permission on the referenced object. The
non-parallel behavior of the two methods is determined based on
unique and full permissions which means the methods that re-
quire read-write (unique or full) access cannot be parallelized
with each other. However, the concurrency analysis in the Pulse
tool is limited in two ways a) it does not consider all the possible
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side effects comprising full and pure permissions, b) it does
not support immutable and share permissions, as a part of its
concurrency analysis, and consequently, the model-checker is not
able to consider the method’s side effects for following pairs of
(pre-)permission contracts between two methods e.g., {(full,
pure), (pure, full), (share, pure), (share, share)},
and reports them to be concurrent. However, methods with these
specifications, as a part of the method contract, if allowed to ex-
ecute in parallel can cause data races of the form <write-read>,
<read-write> or <write-write>.
Table 3 shows the expected method-pair concurrency analysis that
should be performed for a sequential program to void data races
when the program is actually parallelized based on access permis-
sions. The symbol ‖ indicates the parallel execution of the two
methods, whereas the symbol ∦ shows the fact that the specified
methods should be executed in parallel with each other.
Table 3: Expected method-pair concurrency analysis.
APs(m2)
unique full share immutable pure
A
Ps
(m
1)
unique ∦ ∦ ∦ ∦ ∦
full ∦ ∦ ∦ ∦ ∦
share ∦ ∦ ∦ ∦ ∦
immutable ∦ ∦ ∦ ‖ ‖
pure ∦ ∦ ∦ ‖ ‖
Further, in the Pulse tool, the model-checker does not perform con-
currency analysis of the program using pre-permission contracts of
the form (immutable,immutable) and (pure,immutable)
between two methods. Table 4 shows the method-pair concurrency
analysis performed by the Pulse tool where the symbol X indi-
cates the options where Pulse identifies the method’s side effects
correctly, whereas the symbol ? shows the option where either the
Pulse too does not support the permission annotations or performs
incorrect analysis.
Table 4: Method-pair concurrency analysis in Pulse.
APs(m2)
unique full share immutable pure
A
Ps
(m
1)
unique X X ? ? X
full X X ? ? ?
share ? ? ? ? ?
immutable ? ? ? ? ?
pure X ? ? ? X
The immutable permission being the safe permission, if applica-
ble, can support maximum parallelism between methods without
the fear of data races, and share permission being the most
flexible access can create side effects thereby, data races. There-
fore, these specifications should be considered, as a part of the
concurrency analysis, for sequential programs to parallelize their
execution without the fear of data races.
• The Sip4J framework extends the Pulse concurrency analysis,
by defining the new discrete state semantics for share and im-
mutable permission and by updating the existing discrete state
model of the input specifications (write tokens) in case of full
and pure permissions. The objective was to compute the poten-
tial for concurrency in a sequential program, by considering all
possible side effects, based on five types of access permissions.
Table 5 shows an adjacency matrix showing methods (pair) concur-1100
rency analysis after extending the Pulse analysis. All the blueX
symbols show the concurrency analysis that the Pulse tool performs
based on the permission compatibility and side effects analysis, and
all the redX symbols show the method pair concurrency analysis
extended by our approach. The extended concurrency analysis can
be used to parallelize execution of Java programs, to the extent per-
mitted by the inferred dependencies, without the fear of data races.
Table 5: Extended method-pair concurrency analysis.
APs(m2)
unique full share immutable pure
A
Ps
(m
1)
unique X X X X X
full X X X X X
share X X X X X
immutable X X X X X
pure X X X X X
• It computes the percentage of method pairs that can be parallelised
(including the method with itself) over a state space of (all possible
method pairs) method pairs in a given program. For each class,
it calculates the number of concurrent (method) pairs following
the binomial coefficient formula given below, choosing two (02)
methods from n methods.(
n
2
)
+n=
n!
k!(n−k)!+n
where n is the total number of methods having permission con-
tracts. Figure 5a shows the extended method-pair concurrency
analysis of the Pulse translated version of ArrayCollection
class performed by the Sip4J framework.
The analysis shows that 4 out of 7 (57%)methods could potentially
be executed with at least one other method at the class level. More-
over, the Sip4J concurrency (method pair) analysis shows that,
10 pairs (36%) of methods from a state space of total
(
7
2
)
+7=28
pairs in this class can be run in parallel.
(3) Report Generation: Sip4J extends the Pulse generated (Pdf)
report in two ways a) by automatically adding the Plural annotated
Java program as a part of generated report and b) by incorporat-
ing the results of extended (method-pair) concurrency analysis
of the input program in the generated report. Figure 5b shows
a summary of the correctness and concurrency analysis of Ar-
rayCollection class in the generated report. The objective was
to provide readers a quick, explicit and an integrated view of the
underlying program with the inferred permissions (method-level
dependencies) along with its correctness, code reachability, and
concurrency results at one place.
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1 ArrayCollection
Table 2: Method’s Satisfiability(Code Reachabiity Analysis
Method Satisfiability
ArrayCollection
√
printColl
√
computeStat
√
isSorted
√
findMax
√
incrColl
√
tidyupColls
√
Table 3: State Transition Matrix
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ArrayCollection ∦ ∦ ∦ ∦ ∦ ∦ ∦
printColl ∦ ‖ ‖ ‖ ‖ ∦ ∦
computeStat ∦ ‖ ‖ ‖ ‖ ∦ ∦
isSorted ∦ ‖ ‖ ‖ ‖ ∦ ∦
findMax ∦ ‖ ‖ ‖ ‖ ∦ ∦
incrColl ∦ ∦ ∦ ∦ ∦ ∦ ∦
tidyupColls ∦ ∦ ∦ ∦ ∦ ∦ ∦
3
(a) Concurrency matrix for all the methods in the ArrayCollection class.
Summary
Sink States:0(0× 100)
Table 1: Sip4J Analysis Summary
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ArrayCollection 7 1 0 0 4 28 10 36
ObjectClass 2 1 0 0 0 3 0 0
Client 2 1 0 0 0 3 0 0
Total Classes=3 11 3 0 0 4 34 10 29
1
(b) Summary of the correctness and concurrency analysis for Plural annotated
version of the example program given in Listing 2.
4. Evaluation
We implemented permission inference framework, Sip4J, along
with its integration with Pulse as a Java Eclipse Plugin. We per-
formed the empirical evaluation of the Sip4J framework on com-
putationally intensive Java applications from four benchmarks suites,
Java Grande benchmark (jomp) [16], Æminium5 and Plaid6 and
Crystal7, together with Pulse itself.
The evaluation of the permission inference framework and the
inferred specifications is based on the following research questions
and the experiments.
RQ1: How can we validate the correctness of the inferred spec-
ifications? For this, we automatically perform the correctness
analysis of the inferred specifications using Pulse and by manually
generating the specifications from the source code and comparing
them with the inferred one (Section 4.1).
5https://github.com/AEminium/AeminiumBenchmarks/tree/master/
src/aeminium/runtime/benchmarks/.
6https://github.com/plaidgroup/plaid-lang.
7https://code.google.com/archive/p/crystalsaf/
RQ2: How can we demonstrate the effectiveness of the inferred
specifications to enable concurrency? We automatically perform1150
the concurrency analysis of the inferred specifications (Section
4.1) by extending the Pulse concurrency analysis and by computing
the number of concurrent method pairs in a sequential program.
RQ3: How effective is the permission inference technique itself?
We automatically compute the annotation overhead (effort saved)
by calculating the number of annotations produced by the Sip4J.
RQ4: How efficient is the permission inference technique? We
compute execution time of the analysis to automatically generate
specifications.
Experimental Setup
All experiments were performed on MacBook Pro, Intel Core
i7, (2.3GHz) processor (4 physical cores) and 16GB of RAM. The
development environment includes Eclipse IDE 3.7.2, JDK 1.7 and
Antlr compiler 3.3 and TexLive 2015.
Datasets
The dataset for the evaluation consists of benchmark programs
and realistic Java applications widely used in the research commu-
nity [16, 2, 17, 1, 43, 23] to evaluate the permission-based program
verification approaches and to gain performance improvements in
automatic parallelization approaches. A brief characteristic of the
benchmark programs is given below.
Java Grande benchmark Benchmark is a Java Grande bench-
mark benchmark suit8, consists of scientific and large scale compu-
tation intensive applications such as monetcarlo, moldyn etc.,
aimed at testing performance improvement through Java execution
environments.
Æminium and Plaid Benchmark: All the programs in theÆminium
benchmark consist of data and computationally intensive appli-
cations that mostly solve problems using Arrays and Collec-
tion data structures in Java such as de Columbian Health Care
System[19] and gaknapsack program. The applications were taken
from different sources such as HPCC (High Performance Cluster
Computing)9, BOT (Barcelona OpenMP Tasks Suite)[21] and Java
ForkJoin framework [32]. All the applications in this benchmark
are part of Æminium10 project, a by-default concurrent program-
ming paradigm, that has been used to evaluate the performance of a
single-threaded program on multi-core processors, by parallelizing
its execution based on access permissions.
The data-set common in Æminium and Plaid benchmark consists
of programs implementing recursive data structures and commonly-
used divide-and-conquer (computational intensive) algorithms such
as Fast-Fourier Transform (FFT), Integral, ShellSort, Fibonacci,
and a Webserver applications.
Pulse is a permission-based model checking tool, implemented as
a Java Eclipse Plugin. The tool was developed, as a part of the
Æminium project , to automatically perform permission checking
8https://www.epcc.ed.ac.uk/research/computing/
performance-characterisation-and-benchmarking/
java-grande-benchmark-suite
9https://icl.utk.edu/hpcc/
10http://aeminium.dei.uc.pt/index.php/AEminium
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and verify program behavior based on the specifications. The
motivation behind using the Pulse tool itself as a case study was
to evaluate the permission inference technique on a real-time Java
application of average size, in this case, its 7k plus SLOC. Pulse1200
is an object-oriented program that implements rich Java constructs
such as classes, inheritance, method overloading, regular expres-
sions, and it extensively uses Java APIs, especially the multi-level
linked lists to perform static analysis of the source code with the
input specifications, to generate its abstract state-machine model
that is then verified by a symbolic model checker.
Crystal is a static analysis framework built as an Eclipse Plugin in
Java, developed at Carnegie Mellon University for teaching and re-
search purposes. The static analyzer, Crystal, is an object-oriented
Java application, developed as a part of the Plural11 project. Plural
is a sound modular protocol checking tool that employs access
permissions to allow a flexible aliasing control mechanism to ver-
ify program behavior. Crystal in Plural performs branch-sensitive
data-flow and exceptional control-flow analysis of the Java source
code. The data-flow analysis is based on a ”worklist" algorithm.
The analysis extracts different information at different program lev-
els to perform program verification based on the input permission
specifications.
The motivation behind using the Crystal application is to evaluate
the permission inference mechanism on a realistic big case study,
in this case, 17k plus lines of the source code, that follows object-
oriented concepts such as object encapsulation, object composition,
object aggregation, etc. Moreover, it implements rich Java Spec-
ification Language constructs such as classes, anonymous classes,
inner classes, enumeration classes, abstract classes, method over-
loading, method overriding, multiple inheritance through interfaces,
generics and exceptional handling.
A brief statistics of the benchmark programs are given in Table 6.
4.1. Correctness analysis of the inferred specifications
The Sip4J framework automatically checks the correctness
of inferred specifications using the method (un) satisfiability anal-
ysis in Pulse (previously explained in Section 2.2.2). A method is
satisfiable if all of its pre-conditions are met. In other words, each
method obtains its required permission. The presence of the unsat-
isfiable method is due to the method’s unsatisfiable pre-conditions
which either indicates an error in the inferred specifications or the
missing specifications. Moreover, we cross check the correctness
of the inferred specifications for which we a) manually generate
the specifications, for all the benchmark programs, by looking at
source code b) compare the manually generated annotations with the
specifications inferred by the tool, and the Pulse correctness analysis.
Moreover, we compute the number of safe approximations made
by the inference technique to generate safe permissions (e.g., Full
instead of Pure or Immutable), in some scenerios (explained in
6) on the referenced objects.
Table 7 shows the results of the automatic and manual correct-
ness analysis of all the benchmark programs.
11https://code.google.com/archive/p/pluralism/
Table 6: A brief statistics of the benchmark programs.
Statistics
Benchmark Program SLOC? Classes Methods
Plural crystal 17,512 212?? 1,975
Pulse pulse 7,671 40 461
jomp
montecarlo 1,370 18 196
euler 1,080 7 51
search 666 7 50
moldyn 608 7 43
lufact 549 5 42
crypt 488 5 40
series 359 5 37
sor 354 5 34
sparsematmult 327 4 33
Æminium
gaknapsack 437 6 21
blacksholes 232 6 50
health 232 6 18
Plaid†
webserver 143 3 12
fft 91 4 11
quicksort 66 3 9
shellsort 58 2 7
integral 40 1 5
fibonacci 22 1 4
Example ArrayCollection 71 3 12
Total 32,376 350 3,111
? SLOC computed using SLOCOUNT tool at http://dwheeler.com/slocount
?? It includes three inner classes.
4.1.1. Pulse correctness analysis
The column # Satisfiable(M) in table 7 shows the number of
methods determined by the Pulse to be satisfiable, whereas column1250
# Un_Satisfiable(M) shows the number of methods Pulse deter-
mines to be unsatisfied (unreachable) in a particular program. In
other words, total methods is a sum of satisfiable and unsatisfiable
methods for each program. The results confirms that Sip4J suc-
cessfully infers satisfiable (required or enough) permissions, without
any specification error, for all methods in all the benchmark pro-
grams with three exceptions: montecarlo, Pulse and Crystal.
For monetcarlo, 11 of the 196 methods have been determined
to be un-satisfiable. Upon manual analysis of the montecarlo source
code, we noticed that the unsatisfiability is due to the fact that Pulse
does not support overloaded methods (constructors), and that all
these 11 methods are overloaded methods. For the Crystal, the
analysis shows unsatisfiability for 581 out of 1,975 methods. Again,
this is due to the presence of overloaded methods in Crystal. It
is worth mentioning here that Pulse correctness and concurrency
analysis is based on satisfiable methods. Therefore, we excluded
overloaded methods to perform the correctness and concurrency
analysis of the inferred specifications through Pulse and eventually
removed them from the generated report. However, we manually
analyzed the overloaded methods with their inferred specifications
and found them to be satisfiable.
4.1.2. Manual correctness analysis
In Table 7, column # Safe_approx(M) shows the number of
safe approximations made by Sip4J for the Pulse translated ver-
sion of each benchmark program for M methods.
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Table 7: Correctness analysis of the inferred specifications.
Correctness analysis
Program # Satisfiable(M) # Un_satisfiable(M) # Safe_approx(M)
crystal 1,394 581∗ 288∗∗
pulse 451 10∗ 13
montecarlo 185 11∗ 10
euler 51 0 15
search 50 0 10
moldyn 43 0 10
lufact 42 0 10
crypt 40 0 10
series 37 0 10
sor 34 0 11
sparsematmult 33 0 11
blacksholes 50 0 0
gaknapsack 21 0 0
health 18 0 0
webserver 12 0 0
fft 11 0 0
quicksort 9 0 0
shellsort 7 0 0
integral 5 0 0
fibonacci 4 0 0
ArrayCollection 12 0 0
Total 2,509 602 398
∗ It shows the number of overloaded methods (constructors) in the program.
∗∗ It includes 83 safe approximations for generics (parameterized) methods.
A non-zero number indicates the situation where Sip4J does
not produce optimal solution and this happens in certain situations.
One such situation is when an object is accessed in a library method
call for which we don’t have definition of the method and analysis
generates safe (write instead of read) permissions on the referenced
objects to ensure integrity of the data (the details are given in Section
6). For example, in Java Grande benchmark, all the programs use
class libraries (API) i.e, JGFInstrument and JGFTimer, from
Java Grande Framework with ten (10) library methods called in each
program, for which Sip4J generates safe permissions. In the case
of Crystal, the count is 288 as the application is heavily dependant on
Java class libraries. It also includes 83 safe approximations for the
generics (parameterized) methods, as the permission inference anal-
ysis does not support generics in the Java Specification Language,
for the moment, and for which we generate safe permissions.
In total, Sip4J made 398 safe approximations (permission
annotations) for a total of 3,111 methods, for the Pulse translated
version of 20 benchmark programs, that is 4% of the total anno-
tations (10,157) generated by the Sip4J framework. However,
we observed that generating safe permissions does not affect the
integrity of the specifications and the program itself when actually
used for verification or parallelization purpose, and it does not inval-
idate the effectiveness of our technique in automatically generating
correct specifications from the source program.
4.2. Concurrency analysis of the inferred specifications1300
As a part of concurrency analysis, Sip4J identifies the number
of immutable methods that can potentially be executed with each
other and the method that should always run sequentially based
on access permission contracts, by integrating and extending the
Pulse concurrency analysis for five types of inferred permissions as
explained in Section 3.2.
Table 8 shows the concurrency analysis of all the benchmark
programs. The results of the analysis in Table 8 shows a lower
bound on the number of concurrent method, as discussed previously
we exclude overloaded methods from the Pulse translated version
of each program. In Table 8, column Concur(M) (%) shows the
overall percentage of methods that could be parallelized with at least
one other method (including itself) for M methods in a program
whereas Concur(MP) (%) is the percentage of total number of
method pairs that can be parallelized (including the method with
itself) over all possible pairs of methods for M methods.
For the monetcarlo, the Concur(M) ratio is 49% and the Con-
cur(MP) ratio is 20% for 185 (satisfiable) methods in 18 classes.
For Pulse, the ratio is 67%with 299 methods out of 451 method that
Pulse reports to be satisfiable. We observed that the exclusion of
overloaded constructors does not affect the potential for concurrency
as constructors cannot be parallelized with any other method during
program execution. In summary, the permission-based concurrency
analysis in terms of number of concurrent methods (Concur(MP)%)
vary from 35 to 65% for the Java Grande benchmark benchmark
programs, 5 to 66% forÆminium and Plaid benchmark and 67% for
Pulse and Crystal. Overall, the results show considerable potentials
in our inferred specifications to enable concurrency in sequential
programs, which is one of the motivations of our work.
Table 8: Concurrency analysis of the inferred specifications
Program Concur(M) (%) Concur(MP)%
crystal 944 (67%)µ 52%
pulse 299 (67%)µ 34%
montecarlo 92 (49%)µ 20%
euler 18 (35%) 8%
search 18 (36%) 9%
moldyn 16 (37%) 10%
lufact 25 (59%) 17%
crypt 25(62%) 17%
series 21 (56%) 15%
sor 16 (47%) 11%
sparsematmult 16 (48%) 10%
blacksholes 9 (18%) 6%
gaknapsack 4 (19%) 6%
health 1 (5%) 1%
webserver 8 (66%) 55%
fft 5 (45%) 36%
quicksort 2 (22%) 11%
shellsort 2 (28%) 17%
integral 3 (60%) 20%
fibonacci 2 (50%) 30%
ArrayCollection 5 (41%) 33%
Total 1,531 (61%) -
µ It excludes concurrency analysis of the overloaded methods.
4.3. Annotation overhead analysis
We measure the annotation overhead as a way to quantify the
manual (annotation) effort by measuring the (1) the amount of an-
notations generated by Sip4J on individual field of the referenced
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object, (2) the number of annotated lines generated by Sip4J for
the Pulse translated version of the program and (3) the number of
individual annotations for the Pulse translated version. To compute
annotation overhead, we use number of methodsM, as the basis for
evaluation as the permissions are generated at the method level.
# LOC(M)P in Table 9 shows the lines of contracts (permission an-
notated lines) generated for the Pulse translated version ofMmeth-
ods in a program. It counts one line (a permission contract N) for
eachmethodwith a ‘requires’ and an ‘ensures’ clause, one line
for each class to define typestate information at the class level, and
one line to import the package that supports Plural annotations in a
Java program. Therefore # LOC(M)P=N+C+1. The number of
permission contracts (N) would be equal to the number of methods
M if analysis generates permission contracts for all the methods.
# Anns(M)P in Table 9 calculates the number of individual anno-
tations forMmethods in the Pulse translated version of the each
program. The number of annotations in this case depends on the1350
presence (absence) of annotations on the receiver object (this)
and the number of parameters (aliases of the referenced objects)
accessed in a method.
For each non-constructor method accessing a field of a referenced
object (this), it includes two annotations to specify pre- and
post-permission on the object.
Table 9: Effectiveness and efficiency analysis of the permission inference technique.
Annotation Overhead Performance
Program # LOC(M)Pσ # Anns(M)Pσ # Anns(M)F Time(M)
(sec)
crystal 2,188 5,234/ 6,691/ 1441.056
pulse 513 1,764 4,850 41.84
montecarlo 204 948 1,360 17.95
euler 52 197 1,073 5.42
search 60 204 691 1.41
moldyn 52 205 901 1.40
lufact 50 325 437 1.13
crypt 46 163 385 0.98
series 43 143 207 0.56
sor 42 153 267 0.61
sparsematmult 36 156 316 0.51
blacksholes 56 250 694 1.92
gaknapsack 38 82 250 1.03
health 25 74 334 0.30
webserver 11 25 11 0.24
fft 16 56 44 0.43
quicksort 13 33 17 0.06
shellsort 10 32 44 0.06
integral 7 17 17 0.08
fibonacci 8 18 9 0.03
ArrayCollection 15 78 49 0.16
Total 3,485 10,157 18,647 1,517.47
σ The parameter notations are not included in this count.
/ It includes 2,324 annotations for the 581 overloaded methods with at least 4 annotations per
method.
For each non-constructor method, Anns(M)P counts two (as part
of requires and ensures clause) to add a typestate ‘alive’
as a part of pre- and post-permission for each class field and (or)
parameter at the method level.
For each non-constructormethodwith parameters,Anns(M)P adds
two (pre- and post-permission) for each parameter.
For each non-constructor method that returns a global object or
alias of a global reference, Anns(M)P adds two annotations as a
part of ensures clause to specify the permission generated by a
method on the returned object (R). Finally, Anns(M)P counts one
for the annotation ENDOFCLASS to mark the end of each class in
a program (as required by Pulse).
For each constructor method, there is only one permission annota-
tion for receiver object (this) and one typestate annotation. It can
have only ‘ensures’ clause as part of the permission contract in
Pulse. There are no annotations for the parameters as Pulse does
not support overloaded constructors with parameters.
Let M be the set of methods,MC be the number of constructors,
MFNC be the number of non-constructor methods that access some
global (class) field directly or indirectly in a method,MRNC be the
number of non-constructor methods that returns a referenced object
(i.e.,M=MC+MFNC) +MRNC. AnnsP is defined as:
AnnsP=(1+1)∗MC+(2+2)∗MFNC+
∑
m∈M
(2∗P(m))+2∗MRNC+C
(2)
where P(m) denotes the number of parameters (aliases of some
global object) accessed in method m.
# Anns(M)F calculates the number of permission-based annota-
tions (pre- and post-permissions) generated on individual fields
(F) of the current object (this) for M methods in a program.
The numberof annotations also includes two annotations (gen-
erated as post-permission) on the returned object (R) by a non-
constructor method. Therefore, the number of permission-based
annotations generated at field level forMmethods isAnns(M)F=∑
m∈M(2∗F(m)) + 2∗MRNC, where F(m) is the number of individ-
ual fields and its aliases accessed in method m andMRNC be the
number of methods that returns a referenced object.
In total, Sip4J generated 18,647 permission annotations at the
field level, for 3,111 methods in 350 classes for 20 benchmark pro-
grams and 3,485 permission annotated lines were generated for the
Pulse translated versions of the same programs with 10,157 min-
imum annotations in less than 1,517 seconds (about 26 minutes).
For example, for the Pulse translated version of the example pro-
gram given in Listing 2 with three classes and 12 methods, Sip4J
generated 15 annotated lines with a total of 78 annotations at ob-
ject level and 49 annotations when permissions were generated on
individual fields of the referenced object. Likewise, for Crystal,
Sip4J generated 2,188 annotated lines with a minimum of 5,234
annotations, for 1,394 methods for its Pulse translated version. For
Crystal, we omit the parameter annotations from the annotated ver-
sion to avoid the state space explosion problem due to the model
checking of the specifications in Pulse but that does not invali-1400
date the effectiveness of our technique in generating specifications
without annotation overhead.
The analysis shows the effectiveness of the inference technique
in automatically generating the specifications which otherwise needs
to be manually identified and added in the program and that pose
a significant annotation overhead for the programmers.
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4.4. Performance analysis
We compute efficiency of the permission inference algorithm
by measuring the average execution time of the analysis in seconds,
averaged over 10 independent runs on Java Virtual Machine. Table
9, column Time(M), shows the execution time (in seconds) of the
analysis to parse the source code and infer permissions for M meth-
ods in a program. The result shows that it takes about 18 seconds
to generate specifications for montecarlo program with 196 meth-
ods, and a fraction of a seconds for programs in the Æminium and
Plaid benchmarks being smallest in size. For Crystal, the biggest
case study we evaluated with 17K plus physical source lines of
code, it took 1441.056 seconds (about 25 minutes) to identify the
permission-based dependencies from the source code and generate
2,188 annotated lines of code with a minimum of 6,691 annotations
for 1,394 methods when permission are generated at the field level.
If created manually, the above annotations may take time that
could be multiples of months as in the case of Pulse [17] itself where
authors reported that they took six months to understand (identify)
dependencies and manually annotate a Java application with 55
classes and 376 methods with 546 permission contracts to verify
program behavior. No doubt, the complexity and the design of the in-
put program does have an impact on the annotations generation time.
However, we expect that the execution time of Sip4J can be amul-
tiple of minutes (or hours in the worse-case for really large applica-
tions), but not in months, thus showing the effectiveness of our tech-
nique in generating permission-based annotations while saving time.
5. Implications
We observe, that our proposed framework, Sip4J, by automat-
ically inferring access permission contracts from a source program
not only helps programmers to work at a higher level of abstraction
letting them focus on the functional and behavioural correctness of
the program, but can also be used to automatically identify some of
the syntactical errors in the program, such as null-pointer references,
without actually compiling the program. Further, having contract-
based specifications in an explicit way can help programmers to
identify dependencies at the method level and compute the potential
for concurrency in a sequential program.
We now revisit the motivating example, given in Listing 2, to
demonstrate the efficacy and expressiveness of permission-based
specifications in identifying some of the program properties such as
null pointer exceptions and enabling implicit concurrency present
in a sequential program.
Null Pointers Analysis. With respect to the permission seman-
tics, the null-pointer exceptions can arise in two ways in a pro-1450
gram: (a) program error: reference to an object is a null refer-
ence itself and, (b) permission inference error: no method gen-
erates the permission required of a method, say unique, on the
referenced object as its post-permission. For example, in List-
ing 2, all the methods accessing the shared object, say array1,
would cause a null-pointer exception and would remain un-
reachable, if the client method, (in this case the constructor method),
does not generate unique permission on its referenced object
before using it. Similarly, the post-permissions (none(array1)
and none(array2) of method tidyupColl() indicate that ob-
ject array1 and array2 should be instantiated again, once the
method tidyupColl() has been executed, for these objects to
be used by other methods without generating the null-pointer
exception. The proposed framework can identify such subtle errors
in the program based on the inferred specifications.
Method-level Dependencies Analysis. Further, access permission
contracts can be used to compute the dependencies betweenmethods
and to automatically impose ordering constraints.
For example, a close examination of the requires clause for
method tidyupColl() in Listing 2 (Line 26), shows that the
method can only be called if objects array1 and array2 has
unique permission as pre-permission. This means it can either
be called immediately after the constructor methods ArrayCol-
lection(array1) and ObjectClass(array2), as both gener-
ate its required permissions, or once all the methods accessing the
array1 and array2 object have completed their execution, and
unique permission on the referenced objects have been resumed,
to be used by other methods.
Implicit Concurrency Analysis. Furthermore, having access per-
mission contracts defined, in an explicit way, at the method level,
can be used to compute the number of concurrent methods and
the methods that should always run sequentially. as elaborated in
Section 2.3 and that is also evident from the study of the existing
permission-based parallelization approaches [1, 43].
For example, the method call concurrency graph (Figure 1) given
in Listing 2, reveals the effectiveness of Sip4J framework in gen-
erating access permissions at the field level, that can help achieve
concurrency at amore granular level, than generating permissions on
the whole object. It shows that 11 out of 15 method calls in this pro-
gram can be executed in parallel, based on the inferred (permission)
contracts. Recall the Pulse concurrency analysis for the same pro-
gram in Figure 5b that reports 4 out of 11 methods to be concurrent.
This is because in Pulse, the concurrency analysis of the program is
based on the access permission contracts defined at the object level.
Document Generation. Moreover, the Sip4J framework auto-
matically generates a user-friendly analysis (.pdf visualization) re-
port that provides developers a quick, abstract and explicit view
of the implicit relations (dependencies) that exists at the method
level and their concurrent behavior without looking at the source
code. The generated report can be used by both novice and expert1500
programmers (verifiers) with equal ease to automatically analyze
program behaviour of the program in terms of its null-pointer and
code reachability analysis, without performing any code inspection.
We believe, that the automatic inference of access permission
contracts and its concurrency analysis by the Sip4J framework,
along with its integration with the model checking verification tool,
Pulse, opens a new window for the programmers (verifiers) to
automatically verify the intended behavior of large and complex
applications and to parallelize the execution of sequential programs,
without any extra effort (annotation overhead) and in a safe way
with less time.
6. Threats to Validity
We have identified some limitations of the Sip4j framework and
threats to the validity of the underlying permission inference and
checking approach itself.
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Construct Validity. The permission extractor in Sip4J, at the mo-
ment, does not support all the language constructs in Java Specifica-
tion Language such as method overriding (polymorphism), generics
and lambda expressions. This is because the technique is based
on statically analyzing the source code. However, we believe the
approach can be extended to identify the overridden method called,
as a result of a method call, without actually performing the dynamic
analysis of the program, as we perform flow-sensitive analysis of
the source code to determine the actual instance or type of object
assigned to a reference of base type in an assignment expression.
Moreover, our evaluation on small to large sized benchmark pro-
grams validate that through Sip4J, we have provided a succinct
methodology to infer access permissions for realistic Java programs,
implementing rich constructs of Java Specification Language.
Internal Validity. In certain situations, the permission inference
framework does not produce the optimal (precise) solutions and
generates safe (restrictive) permissions i.e., unique or full in-
stead of immutable or pure.
This happens when a) an object is accessed in a complex infix
expression with nested pre-fix or post-fix expressions or b) an ob-
ject is accessed in a library method call expression. The first case
is because the analysis is based on the type of expressions such
as Field_Access and Assignment encountered in the AST of
program, therefore, the permission extractor does not individually
parse complex infix-postfix expressions as a part of the imple-
mentation. The second case is due to the unavailability of method
definitions (bodies) for the library methods.
We believe this is an engineering problem and generating safe (re-
strictive) permissions will not affect the integrity of the program
itself when actually used for program verification or parallelization
purpose.
External Validity. It is worth noting here that the Sip4j framework,
at the moment, does not automatically check the correctness of the
inferred specifications for the overloaded constructors (methods) and
consequently, it does not include them as a part of its concurrency1550
analysis. We observe, the same is true for the parameter annotations,
generated as a part of the method contracts, in the Pulse translated
version of the input program.
- This is because the Pulse tool does not support overloaded methods
and parameter annotations as a part of its correctness and concur-
rency analysis. Consequently, the Sip4J framework excludes the
overloaded constructors (methods) from the Pulse translated ver-
sion of the program and analyzes them manually. However, the
actual count of the concurrent methods may be misleading (under-
estimated) for programs having overloaded methods. In the case
of parameters, the analysis (explained previously in Section 3.1.1,
internally handles this problem by mapping all the formal param-
eters with their actual references and generating permissions on the
receiver object that are then verified through the Pulse tool.
- Further, the concurrency analysis of the input specifications in the
Pulse tool is performed at the class level, which makes it difficult
for the Sip4J framework to check the potential for concurrency
at the project level. However, it does not invalidate the effectiveness
of the permission inference approach, in generating the correct spec-
ifications without annotation overhead as the problem is due to the
inherent limitation of the Pulse tool itself.
We believe all the limitations discussed above are due to the inherent
limitation of the Pulse tool and are engineering problems that can
be solved, by extending the Pulse analysis with overloaded methods,
and parameter annotations. However, in both cases, we manually
check the inferred specifications as explained in Section 4.1.2.
Termination Analysis. The termination of the permission inference
analysis in the Sip4J tool is based on the following characteristics.
- The analysis is based on the AST of the source code, a parse tree
having a finite number of nodes (sub-expressions) for an expression
statement. Therefore, it takes a finite number of steps to parse the
generate tree with a finite number of expressions. Therefore, the pro-
posed analysis always converges to an expression type, designated
as the base case, or otherwise terminates successfully.
- The presence of indirect or chained recursion, as explained pre-
viously in Section 3.1.1, can cause indefinite (infinite) loops and
consequently, the memory overflows. This is because we save the
meta-data (at-least its signature) of each method, and its current
state, before parsing its body and switching the control to parse
sub-method calls in it. This step helps to identify the second level
(indirect) recursive method call for the same method during parsing,
and to ensure that analysis terminates successfully.
- Another threat for the successful termination of the analysis can be
the expression statements designed as <self-address-flow> state-
ments (when a reference directly or indirectly starts pointing to itself
creating a loop for analysis), the technique identifies such expres-
sions following the pre-defined syntactic rules, (Appendix A.1) and
terminates the analysis successfully, without creating any loop or
cycles during the permission extraction process.
Soundness Analysis. In the context of permissions, the analysis is1600
sound if it generates the required or safe permissions for each mem-
ory location that a method needs to read or write on during its
execution.
The Sip4J tool ensures to generate the required or sufficient per-
missions, we call it safe permissions. For this purpose, the analysis
is supported by the mathematically specified syntactic rules (Ap-
pendix A.1), that help to precisely model the object’s accesses in
a permission-based graph model and generate permissions on the
referenced objects. Further, the underlying approach ensures to min-
imize the number of false positives, which means that the Sip4J
framework always generates permissions when and where required.
Moreover, evaluation of the Sip4J framework on realistic Java
applications and its proof-of-concept by integrating (extending) the
state-of-the-art model checking approach, Pulse, demonstrates the
soundness (at least precision) of the underlying approach in gener-
ating the correct and required permissions.
7. RelatedWork
For the sake of brevity, we will discuss here the most relevant
permission-based concurrent programming paradigms such as Plaid
[1, 2] and Æminium [42, 43], the program verification approaches
[8, 9, 10, 35, 4, 3, 30, 26, 46] and the inference of access permissions
[25, 22, 20] presented in the literature.
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Plural (Permissions Let Us Reason about Aliases) [8] is a formal
specification language and a type system. The language was ini-
tially designed to verify correctness of API protocols such as JDBC,
iterators in Java, and their compliance in sequential and concurrent
programs based on permission-based typestate information where
access permissions are used to keep track of multiple references to
a particular object and typestate [44] defines the valid sequences
of operations that can be performed upon an instance of a given
type. The technique was implemented as a Java Eclipse plug-in [9].
It performs intra-procedural static analysis, called DFA (Diagram
Flow Analysis) of the source code to identify and track access per-
missions and typestate information associated with each program
variable (method parameters, the method receiver object and local
variables) at every program point and issues warning for protocol
violations (if any) at runtime.
In an extended work to Plural, Bierhoff et al. [10] proposed
a technique to infer access permission flow in the system based
on the input specifications. The objective was to avoid permission
tracking overhead associated with splitting and joining the fractional
permission values during program execution. No doubt, Plural helps
programmers to statically follow API protocols and to ensure their
compliance, without actually executing the program. However, to
perform program verification, programmers are required to explicitly
specify permission-based typestate annotations as a part of methods’
contract which creates annotation overhead for programmers.
Chalice [34] is a permission-based specification language and
a program verifier [35] that uses concept of Boyland’s fractional
permissions to reason about the non-interference of shared state in a1650
Chalice program. It defines permission percentages as ‘Full’,‘Some’
and ‘No’, in the range (0, 100], to specify the concurrent read-
ing, (un)sharing of objects among multiple threads, for each heap
location in the program. However, in Chalice, programmer man-
ually annotates program with accessibility predicates, comprising
permission-based specifications as monitor (class) invariants, to
verify its correctness. In a chalice program, the annotation acc(o.f)
represents ‘Full’ permission (100%) that shows that a thread has
exclusive access to the field (f). A non-zero or ‘Some’ permission
shows a read-only access to a particular location (o.f) that is repre-
sented by rd(o.f). The permission contracts are transferred from a
monitor to a thread that acquires this monitor. The approach ensures
that the sum of permissions from all threads remain less than or
equal to 100%. Chalice does not support automatic inference of
access permissions but it uses autoMagic, a command-line option,
to infer ’access’ and ‘pure’ assertions as read and write accesses for
all the non-heap locations in a program.
JavaSyp (Symbolic Permissions for efficient static program ver-
ification) [7] is a permission-based automated program verification
tool that verifies functional correctness of sequential programs such
as Java array list with its iterator. The underlying approach combines
symbolic permissions (unique and immutable) with JML contracts
enforce and control aliasing in the program. The technique performs
static analysis of the source code and generate verification condi-
tions (VCs) based on permission contracts. The inferred conditions
are then used to verify program behavior. In this approach, permis-
sion tracking is straightforward as tracking symbolic values is much
easier than fractions of values. However, it requires programmers
to explicitly specify permission-based specifications (class invari-
ants and other necessary conditions) in the program that creates
annotation overhead for the programmers.
As discussed previously, Pulse [41] is an automatic formal ver-
ification tool that performs static analysis of a Plural annotated Java
program to verify correctness of the input specifications. Cataño
et al. [17] used Pulse to verify correctness of a multi-threaded Java
application MTTS (Multi-threaded task server) by manually adding
Plural specifications in the program. MTTS is a multi-threaded
task distribution server, developed by Novabase that parallelizes
computational tasks over multiple threads. In Pulse, programmers
specify behavioral properties (design intents) of the program as
permission-based locking information and typestate invariants to
enforce the properties that should hold true during program execu-
tion. The authors reported that it took six months to understand
the implicit dependencies in the program and to manually annotate
a Java program with 546 annotated lines of Plural specifications
which poses annotation overhead for the programmers.
VeriFast [29] is a sound, modular and automatic program ver-
ification tool for single and multi-threaded C and Java programs.
However, to enable verification, programmers interactively specify
the access permission contracts using fractional permissions in the1700
range (0,1], by defining Lemma functions in the program written
in classic Separation Logic [39]. The permission value 1 specifies
the exclusive (write) access for manipulating a heap location and
any smaller value less than 1 is used to specify the concurrent read
access for an object between multiple references. Lemma functions
are like ordinary C functions, except that lemma functions and calls
for lemma functions are written inside annotations. The logic-based
specifications are then tracked in the system to ensure that, in a
permission contract, pre-conditions imply post-conditions and verify
program behavior based on input specifications.
VerCors12 [4, 3], is an automated verification tool that verifies
correctness of concurrent data structures based on fractional permis-
sions. The verification approach in VerCors extends Silicon [30]
as a back-end verification tool that natively supports an expressive
permission model. VerCors supports program written in Java and
OpenCL13. The approach exploits verification capabilities of JML
[33] to support multiple synchronization primitives and to reason
about the functional correctness of an input program. However, to
perform verification, it requires programmers to explicitly define
permission-based invariants as JML comments in the program.
In VerCors, permissions are specified using propositional formu-
lae of the form Perm(e.f, pi) at the method level, where pi shows
the fractional permission, in the range (0, 1], associated with the
field f of an object e. The permission are then transferred between
threads at synchronization points and tracked with the execution of
the program. However, instead of simply defining the amount (in
fractions) of the permission transferred, Huisman and Mostowski
[26] extended the fractional permission model in VerCors, by an-
notating program with symbolic expressions that define the kind of
transfer applied to a permission and the owner of the transferred
permissions thereby, using a higher-level of abstractions compared
12https://fmttools.ewi.utwente.nl/redmine/projects/
vercors-verifier/wiki/Puptol/
13Khronos OpenCLWorking Group, The OpenCL specification, http://www.
khronos.org/opencl/
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to Veri-Fast and Chalice.
Viper [30, 37] is a verification infrastructure that encodes per-
mission reasoning in an object-based intermediate language. The
infrastructure includes two back-end verifiers and four front-end
tools for Chalice, Java, Scala, and OpenCL that was developed as a
part of VerCors project [12]. It targets a sequential, object-based in-
termediate language and verifies heap structures in a program based
on the permissions contracts. Like Chalice, in a Viper program,
access rights are specified using accessibility predicates [18] that
define permission-based concrete and recursive specifications as
pre- and post-conditions and the loop invariants for heap structures.
A method can access a particular heap location e.f if appropriate
permissions are held by that location. The annotation acc(e.f)
specifies full permission for a memory location e.f that needs
to be updated while a permission greater than zero specifies a read
access for a particular memory location. The annotated program
is then encoded into an intermediate language by Viper’s front-end
tools to be verified by the back-ends tools. In a Viper program,
access permissions are held by a method execution or in the loop1750
body that are then transferred between method execution and the
loop invariants to verify program behavior and program verification
is based on the input specifications defined at the method level rather
than program implementation.
Ferrara and Müller in [22] developed a technique to infer access
permission rights to verify correctness of concurrent programs for a
small object-based language. The technique performs static analysis
of the source program to infer fractional and counting permissions
based on abstract interpretations [18], a theory for defining and
soundly approximating the semantics of a program. However, to
infer permissions, programmer manually annotate program with the
access notations as pre- and post- conditions at method level.
The approach firstly computes symbolic values (approxima-
tions) for each heap location using the pre- and post-conditions at
method. It then infers constraints over these symbolic values to
reflect permission-based intermediate representations for each heap
location. Finally, it generates specifications in the form of frac-
tional (value between 0 and 1) and counting (value between 0 and
Integer : Max_Value) permissions using the inferred constraints.
The inference technique is implemented in Sample (Static Ana-
lyzer of Multiple Programming LanguagEs)14 that supports pro-
grams written in Scala [38]. However, it is generally acknowledged
that specifications based on fractions (concrete) values are tedious
to write and harder to track and adapt for programmers [25].
Heule et al. [25] proposed a technique that automatically con-
verts fractional permissions for shared-memory concurrent programs
into abstract read and write permission. The objective was to
avoid complex reasoning overhead to specify concrete (fractional)
values for concurrent constructs in a program. This permission sys-
tem generates two kinds of access notations i.e., full and read,
where full represents exclusive access rights and read repre-
sents the read-only access to a shared variable. Like other ap-
proached, the proposed approach takes an annotate program with
accessibility predicates (access & read) as a part of method speci-
fications to infer permission.
14http://www.pm.inf.ethz.ch/research/sample.html
Walter [46] proposed a static analysis to infer quantified permis-
sions and loop invariants for arrays and recursive data-structures in
Viper. Like Viper, the program is first annotated with accessibility
predicates such as acc (loc(array, index).val) to specify
the access rights (acc) for an array index (memory location) and the
loop invariants. The technique identifies the array indices accessed
in a program, through a read or write operations, and generates logi-
cal formulas for all these locations. The locations are then analyzed
by the Viper infrastructure that generates quantified permissions as
weakest pre-condition for the referenced objects. The generated per-
missions are in the form of fractional permissions where 1 represents
full permission and any positive fraction of permission greater than
0, represents the read access. The technique extends input program
with ghost parameters (functions) to infer read permissions for the
specified locations. However, the analysis does not keep account1800
of the aliasing information as it does not allow the expressions on
right hand side of an assignment statement to be heap dependent
therefore, at the moment, the approach does not handle complex
data-structures such as arrays of arrays (2D arrays). Moreover, it is
reported that the approach generates lengthy and complex specifica-
tions that are sometime difficult to read and understand by a human.
Following the initial idea ofWalter’s permission inference mech-
anism for concurrent programs, Dohrauet et al. in [20] proposed a
static analysis to infer permission-based contracts for array manipu-
lating concurrent programs. The analysis supports the programming
languages that supports ownership transfer. The idea is to asso-
ciate a separate permission with each array element based on the
classic Separation Logic [39]. The technique employs fractional
permissions to ensure the exclusive (full) write access on a partic-
ular location while allowing the concurrent (read) access using any
positive fraction of permission. This time the inferred specifications
are human readable but it still does not support arrays of arrays. The
technique is written in Scala and requires an input program written
in the Viper language with user-provided annotations.
Plaid [2] is permission-based programming language that veri-
fies and parallelise execution of typestate-based sequential programs
based on access permissions. It defines permission-based typestate
contract as a part of language. Every type in Plaid is explicitly repre-
sented as a tuple having a type structure and associated permission
to show aliasing and mutability of the corresponding object type. It
uses unique and immutable to define permission for individual ob-
jects, and share permission is used to define the access rights for the
related (shared) objects. Plaid’s run system time then dynamically
track the access permission flow in the program to verify its behavior.
Having a language and run time support for access permissions
in Plaid, Stork et al. [43] developed a new programming paradigm
Æminium to develop by-default concurrent applications based on
access permissions. Like Plaid, it uses three kinds of access permis-
sions: unique, immutable, and share. Æminium leverages access
permission flow through the system to compute data dependencies
at the task level and parallelise execution of the program as permit-
ted by the computed dependencies. Æminium is able to achieve
significant performance improvements, but at the cost of increasing
programmers’ burden to explicitly specify statefull effects in the
form of access permission rights at method level.
Although, all the existing permission-based approaches have
been quite promising in achieving their desired goals. However, the
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approaches are either based on a) formal type theories or program-
ming models or b) use some intermediate representations and (or)
c) generate permissions in low level (concrete) values based on the
provided annotations at the code level.
In our work, we automatically infer symbolic permissions from
the programs written in mainstream programming language (Java)
without using any intermediate representations and method-level
specifications. We observe that relieving programmers from the1850
complex specification (annotation) overhead, the aim of our research,
is applicable to both the program verification and parallelization
approaches We believe that inference of access permissions can be
the next step to exploit the verification and parallelization power
of existing approaches and to enhance their applicability for the
mainstream programmers and verifiers. Moreover, the inference of
access permissions in the form of higher level of abstractions can
free programmers from the low-level analysis and tracking overhead
associated with handling concrete values in the program.
8. Conclusion
To exploit parallelism offered by multi-core processors, main-
stream programming languages such as Java typically make use
of explicit concurrent programming constructs such as threads and
locks. However, such constructs give rise to significant code com-
plexity and errors. Therefore, access permissions-based depen-
dencies have been proposed as an alternative approach to achieve
implicit concurrency without using explicit concurrency constructs.
However, these specifications need to be manually added in the
source program imposing significant additional work for program-
mers which is time consuming and error-prone.
Therefore, in this paper, we propose, Sip4J, a framework to
automatically inferring permission-based implicit dependencies in
the form of symbolic permissions from sequential Java programs
by performing static analysis of the source code. Moreover, we
integrated and extended Pulse, a permission-based model checking
tool to perform empirical evaluation of the inferred specifications
and to reason about their concurrent behavior. Experiments were
performed on 20 programs with 3,111 methods from four widely-
used benchmark datasets, Java Grande benchmark, Æminium, Plaid,
Crystal and Pulse itself to evaluate the correctness and effectiveness
of the inferred annotations, as well as the efficiency of our inference
algorithm. The concurrency analysis of the inferred specifications
using Pulse and the Sip4J confirms that on average, 61%methods
can be parallelised with each other based on the inferred contracts in
all the benchmark programs. Our algorithm also infers permission-
based annotations efficiently, averaging 2 seconds for annotating
a single method. Moreover, all the experiments demonstrate the
feasibility and benefits of our framework to the related permission-
based verification and parallelization approaches in the literature to
achieve their intended benefits without imposing additional work
(annotation overhead) for programmers.
We observe that the inference of permission contracts can fur-
ther be used to automatically infer the synchronization primitives
(locking and ordering constraints) from the source code of sequential
programs and to parallelize program execution for the mainstream
programming languages such as Java, without using any new pro-
gramming language and run time system to support access permis-
sions. Further, the inference of permission-based synchronization
constructs (such as acquire and release locks with permission in-
variants) can be used to verify the behavior of already concurrent1900
programs without imposing extra work on the programmer side.
To this end, we have envisaged a number of future directions
relevant to the proposed framework. We plan to (a) expand the
inter-procedural static analysis to incorporate more Java language
constructs such as polymorphism, generics, lambda expressions and
others; (b) infer access permissions at a more granular level, such
as individual permissions for members of collections or arrays; (c)
develop an online system to encourage the wider adoption of the
proposed technique; (d) automatically infer the permission-based
locking and ordering constraints to develop by-default concurrent
application in Java; (e) extend Pulse analysis to overcome its exist-
ing limitations and provide a comprehensive support for the Java
Specification Language; and (f) integrate Plural, Pulse and Sip4J
to develop an integrated framework for permission-based automatic
program verification for Java.
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Appendix
A.1. Syntactic Rules for Modelling Object Accesses in a program
A.1.1. Modelling Object Accesses in the Current Method
This section presents the syntactic rules that capture expression statements in a method and that have been used to support the data-flow
and alias-flow analysis of the source code during the metadata extraction phase of the permission inference approach, as explained in
Section 3.1.1. The rules are being divided into two main types depending on their access by the current method and other methods: a)
Statement rules, and b) Context rules, during the analysis. The rules are further categorized according to the type of expressions such
as <FieldAccess>, <Assignment> or <MethodInvocation>, encountered during each expression statement and the type of reference
variable (<grv>, <lrv>, <lv>) accessed in each expression. During parsing, each expression is recursively parsed to fetch the type of
expressions designed as based cases. The extracted dependencies are then mapped in the form of a permission-based graph model as
explained previously in Section 3.1.2.
The rules follow the style of sequent calculus in Linear logic, with connectives and implication ( ) operator, to enforce the strong
and constructive interpretation of the specified rules as formulas, to support the analysis.
A complete list of the modelling rules is given below.
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I. Statement Rules for the Global References
<Type> <grv>
(GR-Decl, <grv>)
<do-nothing>
<grv> |super.<grv> |this.<grv> |<ClassName>.<grv> |<obj>.<grv>
(GR-Read-Only, <grv>)
addReadEdge(this_m, <grv>)
[PRIM_TYPE] <grv> = <grv1> |<LITERAL>
(GR-Val-Flow,<grv>)
addWriteEdge(this_m, <grv>)(∀a∈ aliasOf(<grv>) addWriteEdge(this_m, a)),(apply(GR-Read-Only, <grv1>)
[<Type>] <grv> = new <Type>(<grv2>)|<Number_Literal>
(GR-New-Obj, <grv>)
(addWriteEdge(this_m,<grv>) ( apply(Context-N,<grv>)),(apply(GR-Read-Only, <grv2>)
[<REF_TYPE>] <grv> = <grv1>
(GR-Add-Flow, <grv>)
(∃aliasEdge(<grv>, <grv2>) ( removeAliasEdge(<grv>, <grv2>)), addAliasEdge(<grv>, <grv1>)
apply(GR-Read-Only, <grv1>)
[<REF_TYPE>] <grv> = <lrv>
(GR-Addr-Flow, <lrv>)
(∃aliasEdge(<lrv>, <grv1>)(addAliasEdge(<grv>, <lrv>))
(∃aliasEdge(<grv>, <grv2>)(removeAliasEdge(<grv>, <grv2>)),apply(GR-Read-Only, <grv1>)
[<REF_TYPE>] <grv> = <lv>
(GR-Addr-Flow, <lv>)
(∃aliasEdge(<grv>, <grv1>)(removeAliasEdge(<grv>, <grv1>))
<Type> <grv> = <Null_Literal>|MCall(<post-perm>,<grv1>)
(GR-NullAddr-Init, <grv>)
<do-nothing>|MCall(<post-perm>,<grv1>)
<grv> = <Null_Literal>|MCall(<post-perm>,<grv2>)
(GR-NullAddr-Flow, <grv>)
addWriteEdge(this_m, <grv>)(∃aliasEdge(<grv>, <grv1>)(removeAliasEdge(<grv>, <grv1>)
apply(Context-N, <grv>)),(∀ a ∈ aliasOf(<grv>),apply(<GR-NullAddr-Flow>, a)))
,apply(MCall(<post-perm>, <grv1>))
<grv> = <lrv>
(GR-SelfAddr-Flow, <lrv>)
(∃aliasEdge(<lrv>, <grv>)(<do-nothing>)
<grv> = <grv>
(GR-SelfAddr-Flow, <grv>)
<do-nothing>
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II. Statement Rules for the Local References
<lrv>
(LR-Read-Only, <lrv>)
(∃aliasEdge(<lrv>, <grv>)((apply(GR-Read-Only(<grv>))
<lrv>.<grv1> = <Number_Literal>
(LR-Val-Flow, <lrv>)
(∃aliasEdge(<lrv>, <grv>)(apply(GR-Val-Flow, <grv1>))
[<REF_TYPE>] <lrv> = <grv>
(LR-Addr-Flow, <grv>)
(∃aliasEdge(<lrv>, <grv1>)(removeAliasEdge(<lrv>,<grv1>)),addAliasEdge(<lrv>,<grv>))
apply(GR-Read-Only, <grv>)
[<REF_TYPE>] <lrv> = <lrv1>
(LR-Addr-Flow, <lrv>)
(∃aliasEdge(<lrv>,<grv>)(removeAliasEdge(<lrv>,<grv>)),
(∃aliasEdge(<lrv1>,<grv1>)(addAliasEdge(<lrv>,<lrv1>),apply(GR-Read-Only, <grv1>))
[<REF_TYPE>] <lrv> = <lv>
(LR-Addr-Flow, <lv>)
(∃aliasEdge(<lrv>, <grv>)(removeAliasEdge(<lrv>,<grv>))
<lrv> = new <[<REF_TYPE>]>(<grv2> |<Number_Literal>
(LR-New-Obj, <lrv>)
(∃aliasEdge(<lrv>,<grv1>)(removeAliasEdge(<lrv>,<grv1>)
(apply(GR-Read-Only,<grv2>))
<lrv> = <Null_Literal>|MCall(<post-perm>,<grv>)
(LR-NullAddr-Flow, <lrv>)
(∃aliasEdge(<lrv>, <grv>)(removeAliasEdge(<lrv>, <grv>),
(∀ a ∈ aliasOf(<lrv>),apply(<GR-NullAddr-Flow>, a)),apply(MCall(<post-perm>,<grv>))
<Type> <lrv> = <Null_Literal>|MCall(<post-perm>,<grv>)
(LR-NullAddr-Init, <lrv>)
<do-nothing>)|MCall(<post-perm>,<grv>)
<lrv> = <grv>
(LR-SelfAddr-Flow, <lrv>)
(∃aliasEdge(<lrv>,<grv>) ( <do-nothing>
<lrv1> = <lrv1>
(LR-SelfAddr-Flow, <lrv>)
<do-nothing>
III. Statement Rules for Method Calls
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MCall([<args>])|super.MCall([<args>])|super([<args>])
MCall(Immutable, <grv>)
addReadEdge(<grv>, this_m) apply(Context-R, <grv>)
MCall([<args>])|super.MCall([<args>])|super([<args>])
MCall(Pure, <grv>)
addReadEdge(this_m, <grv>), apply(Context-RW, <grv>)
MCall([<args>])|super.MCall([<args>])|super([<args>])
MCall(Full, <grv>)
addWriteEdge(this_m, <grv>), apply(Context-R, <grv>)
MCall([<args>])|super.MCall([<args>])|super([<args>])
MCall(Share, <grv>)
addWriteEdge(this_m, <grv>) apply(Context-RW, <grv>)
MCall([<args>])|super.MCall([<args>])|super([<args>])
MCall(Unique, <grv>)
addWriteEdge(this_m, <grv>), apply(Context-N, <grv>)
MCall([<args>])|super.MCall([<args>])|super([<args>])
MCall(None, <grv>)
<do-nothing>
A.1.2. Modelling Object Accesses through Other Methods
As discussed previously in Section 3.1.2, the context rules model the read, write behavior of other methods on the shared objects
accessed in the current method.
I. Context Rules for the Global References
<grv>
(Context-R, <grv>)
addReadEdge(context, <grv>)
<grv>
(Context-RW, <grv>)addReadEdge(context, <grv>), addWriteEdge(context, <grv>)
<grv>
(Context-N, <grv>)
removeReadEdge(context, <grv>), removeWriteEdge(context, <grv>)
II. Context Rules for the Local References
<lrv>
(Context-R, <grv>)
(∃aliasEdge(<lrv>, <grv>) ( apply(Context-R, <grv>))
<lrv>
(Context-RW, <grv>)(∃aliasEdge(<lrv>, <grv>) ( apply(Context-RW, <grv>))
<lrv>
(Context-N, <grv>)(∃aliasEdge(<lrv>, <grv>) ( apply(Context-N, <grv>))
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A.2. Access Permission Inference Rules2100
This section lists the access permission inference rules used to generate five types of symbolic permissions on the objects referenced
in a method, as explained previously in Section ??.
¬∃readEdge(context,<grv>) ∧ ¬∃writeEdge(context, <grv>)∃readEdge(this_m, <grv>) ∧ ∃writeEdge(this_m, <grv>)
(Unique)
unique(<grv>)
¬∃writeEdge(this_m,<grv>) ∧ ∃readEdge(<grv>,this_m) ∧ ¬∃writeEdge(context,<grv>) ∧ ∃readEdge(<grv>,context)
(Immutable)
immutable(<grv>)
∃readWriteEdge(this_m,<grv>) ∧ ¬∃writeEdge(context,<grv>) ∧ ∃readEdge(<grv>,context)
(Full)
full(<grv>)
∃writeEdge(this_m,<grv>) ∧ ∃readEdge(<grv>,this_m) ∧ ∃writeEdge(context,<grv>) ∧ ∃readEdge(<grv>, context)
(Share)
share(<grv>)
¬∃writeEdge(this_m,<grv>) ∧ ∃readEdge(<grv>,context) ∧ ∃writeEdge(context,<grv>)
(Pure)
pure(<grv>)
¬∃writeEdge(this_m,<grv>) ∧∃readEdge(<grv>,this_m) ∧¬∃writeEdge(context,<grv>) ∧¬∃readEdge(<grv>,context)
(None)
none(<grv>)
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